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We analyze commonality in informed trading across stocks, and how informed trading varies 
with the structural and trading characteristics of a firm. We thereby isolate the residual level of 
informed trading that is unrelated to commonality, trading characteristics, and structural charac-
teristics and analyze this measure with respect to its characteristics and pricing relevance. We 
find evidence of commonality in informed trading, and a systematic dependence of the level of 
informed trading on firm characteristics, such as, tick size, the existence of options, and the size 
of the ownership stake of outside parties. Most importantly, we find that the residual level of in-
formed trading is the component of informed trading most strongly related to required returns. 
This indicates that an important part of the information risk premium is related to the inability to 
differentiate between price fluctuations that are caused by changes in fundamental value from 
random price moves. 
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1 Introduction and Motivation 
Recent corporate scandals (e.g., Enron, WorldCom and others) have focused the attention of 
regulators and market participants on the extent and market impact of private information and the 
resulting information asymmetry between investors. It is fairly challenging empirically, however, 
to numerically capture such fuzzy a concept as the information environment in general and pri-
vate information in particular. At least a subset of such private information is periodically re-
vealed to the market through trading by investors with access to private value-relevant informa-
tion. Hence, an important way to infer the level of private information that informed investors 
have and uninformed investors do not is through the use of a suitable variable that can measure 
the profits from informed trading. This paper is an empirical investigation of the level of in-
formed trading that is inferred using methodologies from the market microstructure literature. 
In this paper, the level of informed trading is estimated in two ways. First, the probability 
of informed trading, popularly known as PIN, is used, which is developed, tested and used in, for 
instance, Easley and O'Hara (1992),  Easley, Kiefer, and O'Hara (1997a, b), and Easley, 
Hvidkjaer, and O'Hara (2002). Second, to improve the validity of the analysis and the degree the 
results presented in this paper can be generalized, informed trading is also approximated by the 
spread revenues lost, on average, by liquidity suppliers in the short-term to liquidity takers, a 
group that arguably includes informed investors (Harris (2003, p. 226)). Such a measure has been 
extensively used in the literature in a different context to proxy for informed trading (see, e.g., 
Hansch, Naik, and Viswanathan (1999); Naik and Yadav (2003b)). 
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A large body of academic literature has modeled the role of private information in asset 
markets.1 The existence of private value-relevant information that is known by only a few inves-
tors implies the existence of information asymmetry, i.e., an unequal distribution of value-
relevant information across investors. The inter-relationship between private information that ex-
ploits information asymmetry and trading behavior has also been extensively modeled.2 And, 
very importantly, the empirical results of Easley, et al. (2002) show that information asymmetry 
is priced in the required rate of return. Clearly, the underlying information environment is of 
critical importance in explaining both observed trading behavior (Chordia, Roll, and Subrah-
manyam (2000)) and the cost of capital (Easley and O'Hara (2004)). Yet, even though the extant 
empirical market microstructure literature addresses a wide range of issues that are broadly rele-
vant in this context,3 surprisingly little is known about informed trading observed in the financial 
markets, such as the extent of commonality in informed trading across stocks or the degree of co-
                                                 
1  Akerlof (1970) relates the occurrence of private information to asset characteristics and trading mechanisms. In-
centives to conceal negative information make companies in Brealey, Leland, and Pyle (1977) actively create private 
information. Informed traders that exploit private information acquire such information as long as the marginal bene-
fit, realized via profitable trading, compensates for the marginal costs of information acquisition, which implies that 
there always remains some pieces of un-revealed private information (Grossman and Stiglitz (1980)). Uninformed 
investors will try to infer additional information from similar, correlated firms, which – if communicating informa-
tion is costly – makes firms to disclose less (Admati and Pfleiderer (2000)). Incomplete information makes unin-
formed investors require a risk premium (Merton (1987)), which also applies if some of the missing information is 
known by only a few, informed, investors (Easley and O'Hara (2004)). 
2 Early models include the following papers. In Kyle (1985), private information gets revealed through the price-
impact of order-imbalances. To minimize the price-impact of their transactions, informed investors split their trades 
strategically over time, which results in private information being only successively impounded into prices (Kyle 
(1985)). Glosten and Milgrom (1985) suggest that liquidity suppliers recover their losses from informed trades by 
charging higher bid-ask spreads. Their sequential trade model is developed further in Easley and O'Hara (1987), who 
add the trade sequence to order-imbalance as conditioning information used by the market maker. This feature helps 
explain the positive relationship between the price-impact of a trade and trade size. Some stylized facts of empirical 
market microstructure, such as intra-day seasonality in turnover, are explained by the model by Admati and Pflei-
derer (1988) where liquidity considerations lead to a clustering of trades by informed and uninformed investors. 
3 For example, in addition to the references cited in the text, (Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996)) find that liquidity 
is priced. Breen, Hodrick, and Korajczyk (2002) show that stock-level trading characteristics and cross-sectional 
characteristics are related to microstructure phenomena. Stock-level order-imbalances have been found to be related 
to returns (Chordia and Subrahmanyam (2004)). In particular, the relationship of lagged order-imbalance, firm size, 
and daily stock returns suggests – in the spirit of Kyle (1985) – that informed investors in large firms break up their 
trades into smaller ones that are successively executed stretching out the price adjustment to new information over 
time. 
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variation of informed trading across stock-level and market-wide characteristics.4 This paper 
aims to address this gap in the literature. 
Information asymmetry and thus informed trading can arise not just from insider informa-
tion that corporate managers and their affiliates have. Investors unconnected to a particular firm 
may invest resources to acquire price-relevant private information (Grossman and Stiglitz (1980)) 
that can be firm-specific (Kim and Verrecchia (1994, 1997)), applicable to many firms (Chordia, 
et al. (2000); Subrahmanyam (1991)), or that can be related to the trading environment (Madrigal 
(1996)).5 
                                                 
4 There has been some research focusing on links between information asymmetry and single firm-specific character-
istics, such as the relationship of information asymmetry and options volume (Easley, O'Hara, and Srinivas (1998)), 
institutional ownership (Dennis and Weston (2001)), or credit ratings (Odders-White and Ready (2006)). 
5 Subrahmanyam (1991) shows that trading index certificates instead of the individual underlying securities reduces 
uninformed investors’ adverse selection costs related to private information about systematic return factors. Model-
ling private information about market-wide systematic return factors – next to firm-specific insider information – is 
also an important element in Admati (1984) and Hughes, Liu, and Liu (2005). Theoretically, information about the 
systematic return component centers around mapping the factor realizations into returns via factor-mimicking portfo-
lio returns (see, e.g., Ferson (2003)). If the mapping is known for sure in markets with no private information, prices 
should adjust instantaneously to new factor realizations. In reality, this adjustment process is stretched out over time, 
however. Fleming and Remolona (1999), for instance, attribute to private information the period of price volatility 
that follows the almost transaction-free price adjustment in the Treasury market to economic news. In this situation, 
the economic factor realization itself is already known to the public, this implies that private information contains 
knowledge about the mapping of the factor realization into prices. This makes private information about market-wide 
phenomena the type of private information investors are exposed to in the Treasury market (see, e.g., Boni and Leach 
(2002)). Private information generated from financial reporting data is suspected to be amongst the drivers of in-
formed trades in the stock market by some theoretical models (see, e.g., Kim and Verrecchia (1994, 1997)). Thus, 
public data can be a valuable source of private information.  
Gilson, Healy, Noe, and Palepu (2001) find some analysts to consistently issue superior forecasts about the fi-
nancial performance of firms. Some market participants are therefore particularly skilled in processing public data 
derived from, e.g., financial reports or analyses of the current economic situation, in private information that under-
lies such superior forecasts. Price-relevant private information is only generated as long as the trading profit derived 
from this private information equals marginal costs (Grossman and Stiglitz (1980)). This implies that the private in-
formation that financial analysts generate at a cost is exploited by informed traders, which is evidenced by the fact 
that analysts’ information is reflected in prices (Bhushan (1989a)). This implies that there are two types of informed 
trades: Trades that are based on insider information from investors that just happen to acquire a piece of price-
relevant private information, e.g., tip-offs from corporate executives, and informed trades that are based on the 
analysis of publicly available data. 
As analysts differ significantly in their area of expertise (Gilson, et al. (2001)), private information is likely to be 
about individual firms (Kim and Verrecchia (1994)), about sectors (Chordia, et al. (2000)), or about market-wide 
return factors (Subrahmanyam (1991)), depending on analysts’ skill and expertise. Public information that applies to 
many firms and that is used to generate private information should lead to common movements in informed trading 
of those stocks. In fact, commonality in informed trading based on public information is likely to be amongst the 
causes for commonality in trading activity. Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001), for instance, observe commonality in trad-
ing activity, which they attribute to investors with macroeconomic information that trade the same basket of stocks. 
Likewise, Chordia, et al. (2000) find commonality in quoted and effective spreads and note that informed trading 
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The level of informed trading should also depend on the structural characteristics of a 
firm. For example, as small firms are traded less frequently and have a lower analysts following 
Bhushan (1989b), they should expose public investors to more information asymmetry as larger 
firms. Lakonishok and Lee (2001), for instance, find that investors in small firms that have a low 
analyst following are particularly exposed to trades by corporate insiders. Easley, et al. (1998) 
document a relationship between information asymmetry and options volume, Dennis and Wes-
ton (2001) find a relationship between information asymmetry and institutional ownership, and 
Odders-White and Ready (2006) study the relationship between information asymmetry and 
credit ratings. 
One major contribution of this paper is to comprehensively investigate, for the first time, 
the extent of commonality in informed trading and the influence of stock-level trading character-
istics and firm-specific structural characteristics on the level of informed trading.  Given the rela-
tionship between informed trading and common market-wide factors, and the relationship be-
tween informed trading and the structural and trading characteristics of a firm, it is possible to 
calculate the expected level of informed trading. The unexplained part of the observed level of 
informed trading is what this paper refers to as Residual Asymmetric Information – labeled RAIN 
for brevity and ease of exposition. RAIN is interpreted as a measure that captures the aggregate 
net economic effect of the abnormal, unexpected level of informed trading which, as suggested in 
footnote 5, also captures trades by insiders. 
This paper makes another important contribution to market microstructure research by ex-
amining which component of informed trading is priced in the cross-section. Easley, et al. (2002) 
                                                                                                                                                              
could be one explanation. If informed traders exploit information on the stock-level trading environment (Madrigal 
(1996)), this co-variation could be across the entire market or could be associated with the market environment of 
individual stocks. Informed trades based on insider information, by contrast, should not show commonality. Thus, 
one should be able to decompose informed trading into trading on private information based on public data and in-
sider information-related trading that is unrelated to common movements. 
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and Easley and O'Hara (2004) show that exposure to informed trading is priced in the cross-
section of stock returns. However, if commonality is present in informed trading, it is an empiri-
cal question whether the resultant predictability of informed trading activity reduces overall in-
formation risk – by improving the information set of the public investor – or whether the resultant 
reduction in the ability to diversify exposure to informed trading increases overall information 
risk. To address this issue, the return relevance of the systematic common-factor dependent com-
ponent of informed trading and the return relevance of RAIN, the residual unexplained part of in-
formed trading is tested. 
The empirical analysis of this paper is based on all reasonably liquid stocks traded on the 
New York Stock Exchange (hereafter NYSE) covering the eleven-year period between January 
1995 and December 2005. Results show strong evidence of commonality in informed trading.6 
Market volatility, market trading volume, market-level bid-ask spreads, and market-level order-
imbalance are all significantly related to the level of informed trading. Evidence of individual 
firm-specific components in informed trading is also found. Further investigations reveal a com-
mon, market-wide component in information asymmetry related to skilled information analysts 
who, consistent with Kim and Verrecchia (1994, 1997), generate private information from public 
data. It further appears that trades by this category of investors successively impound private in-
formation into prices, which is consistent with the strategic cost-minimizing trading behavior of 
                                                 
6 In reality, one may figure market-wide informed trading as trading, done by large institutional investors that act in 
concert to similar information, thereby generating the same orderflow. Information that may be relevant to these in-
vestors may be based on economic data or announcements of economic and monetary policy decision that are re-
leased on a particular point in time and apply to many firms in a similar fashion. Alternatively, Admati and Pfleiderer 
(2000) show that new data that applies to a small set of dominant firms in a particular industry may be used by inves-
tors to enhance their information-set of related firms in the same industry, potentially causing the same trades across 
many stocks at once. To implement these trades, traders may need to make use of electronic devices. Some types of 
investors, e.g., hedge funds, may be particularly strong users of this type of information as its implementation calls 
for a high degree of technical expertise while the associated turnover-considerations, in particular trading costs, are 
less important. Malkiel and Saha (2005) report that a hedge funds are considered to account for up to half of the trad-
ing volume of the NYSE, showing that these traders, which are typically associated with informed traders, are likely 
to be amongst those that implement high turnover strategies that call for simultaneous trades of many stocks at once. 
(See also Khandani and Lo (2007) for hedge-fund strategies and their turnover implications.)  
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informed investors in Kyle (1985) and the empirical findings in Chordia and Subrahmanyam 
(2004). In addition, informed trading turns out to decrease in firm size and, consistent with Den-
nis and Weston (2001), in the size of the ownership stake of outside parties. The results are also 
in line with Easley, et al. (1998) as the level of informed trades seems to be lower if there are ex-
change-traded options on the stock. This indicates that some informed traders migrate to the op-
tions market, which reduces the exposure of equity investors to informed trades. 
About forty-five percent of explained variation in informed trading can be attributed to 
market-wide commonality, while the rest is attributed to the firm-level environment captured by 
firm-specific structural characteristics and the stock-level trading environment. Differences in the 
relative importance of market-wide commonality, the stock-level trading environment, and firm-
specific structural characteristics across firm size highlight the relevance of disclosure that takes 
into account characteristics of the firm as shown in the model by Admati and Pfleiderer (2000). 
Finally, the unexplained part of informed trading, RAIN, is priced in the asset’s required 
rate of return, and its effect on pricing is stronger and more robust than that of total informed 
trading. This shows that the price relevance of information risk is not just the result of the inabil-
ity to diversify away exposure to informed trades as is commonly believed. Results indicate that 
the inability to forecast the level of informed trading, and hence the inability to differentiate be-
tween random price fluctuations and changes in fundamental value, is an important driver of the 
information risk premium.7 Thus, changes in the component of informed trading that are unre-
lated to firm characteristics, the trading environment, and the market as a whole contribute sig-
nificantly to the information risk premium. 
                                                 
7 Bhushan (1989b) shows that investors can free ride on the costly information acquisition process of information 
analysts by observing the stock price and thereby, at least partially, infer the information that the informed investor 
has acquired himself at a cost (see also Admati and Pfleiderer (2000)). The weaker the link between the information 
content of price innovations and the environment is, however, the less useful as a source of information prices are, as 
it becomes increasingly difficult to differentiate random price fluctuations from price changes induced by trades on 
private information. 
  7
To summaries, this paper contributes to the literature related to the information environ-
ment of a firm in two important ways. First, it is shown how time-series and cross-sectional fac-
tors influence informed trading, and how these can be accounted for to infer abnormal informa-
tion risk. Firms and traders could potentially use the empirical results presented here to limit ex-
posure to informed trading. Second, this paper addresses the question of the price-relevance of 
the information environment of a firm and thereby contributes to academic market microstructure 
research that relates the information environment to asset prices (see, e.g., Easley, et al. (2002); 
Easley and O’Hara (2004)). 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 develops the relevant hy-
potheses, Section 3 presents the methodology, and Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 docu-
ments the empirical results, and Section 6 provides concluding remarks. 
2 Development of Hypotheses 
One source of variation in information asymmetry could be attributed to common factors next to 
firm-specific ones as is commonly suggested.8 Variation in trading behavior has been attributed 
to firm-specific trading characteristics (e.g., see Chordia and Subrahmanyam (2004)) or cross-
sectional firm-level structural characteristics (e.g., see Breen, Hodrick, and Korajczyk (2002)). 
As observed trading behavior is considered to be related to its information content (see, for in-
stance, Kyle (1985)), we expect that information asymmetry measured in financial markets to be 
related to market-wide commonality factors, and firm-level trading and structural characteristics. 
So far, the specific nature of the systematic factors in information asymmetry received little em-
                                                 
8 Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001) explain commonality in volume by investors who use a similar set of information to 
trade a similar portfolio of stocks. Kim and Verrecchia (1994) show that this set of information may include private 
information made out of what is publicly known. Commonality factors that underlie market-wide changes in ob-
served trading behavior are therefore likely to include market-wide changes in trades that exploit private information 
on market-wide changes in expected returns. As private information can therefore refer to systematic as well as idio-
syncratic return components (Hughes, Liu, and Liu (2005)), one would expect that variation in observed information 
asymmetry is the result of changes in market-wide and firm-level factors. 
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pirical attention, however. We address this gap in the literature and derive a set of testable hy-
potheses based on empirical implications of microstructure models and hypothesized relation-
ships between information asymmetry and observable data found in empirical studies.  
Order-imbalance, for instance, is commonly attributed to trading pressure created by in-
formed trades (e.g., Kyle (1985)), which also applies to observed return-volatility (French and 
Roll (1986)). As prices converge faster to their underlying value with lower minimum tick-size 
(Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2005)), it is likely that smaller minimum price-increments in 
general lead to informationally more efficient prices. This suggests that the lower the tick-size, 
the more information is impounded into prices over a given time-interval, which results in a 
higher level of information asymmetry measured in the financial markets. Alternatively, as prices 
are more efficient the lower the tick-size (Chordia et al. (2005)), one could also see a decline of 
information asymmetry in tick-size, which makes the association of tick-size and realized infor-
mation asymmetry an empirical issue.  
The most common way liquidity providers react to informed trades is by increasing the 
bid-ask spread to recover their expected losses to informed traders (Glosten and Milgrom 
(1985)). As informed traders act strategically in timing their trades (Kyle (1985)), they are likely 
to postpone their trading activity until market depth recovers. Higher trading activity could lead 
to this recovery, as it is considered being mainly the result of liquidity providers joining the mar-
ket (Glosten and Milgrom (1985)). Alternatively, higher volume results in relatively noisy prices, 
which increases the benefit of private information (Bhushan (1989a)). As informed traders hide 
among liquidity traders (Admati and Pfleiderer (1988)), this could also lead to more informed 
trades with higher trading volume. If some traders have private information about systematic re-
turn components, one would expect their trading to affect aggregate market-volume, as fluctua-
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tions in random uninformed trading activity should cancel out on a market level. This implies that 
higher market-level trading activity is likely the result of informed traders joining the market (as 
Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) show for intra-day trade-clustering) while increases in trading ac-
tivity on an individual stock-level is likely to be due to uninformed traders. 
We therefore expect to find commonality factors in information asymmetry that are posi-
tively related to market-wide changes in bid-ask spreads, trading volume, volatility, and order-
imbalance. The observed market-wide variation should be the result of informed trades acting on 
common, market-wide signals.  
Most of the literature on information asymmetry considers the interaction of informed 
trades and firm-level phenomena, whereby firm-specific trading characteristics receive particular 
attention by market-microstructure research. Based on earlier studies mentioned previously, we 
hypothesize that stock-level volatility, order-imbalance, and bid-ask spreads all have a positive 
association with the level of information asymmetry. Stock-level trading volume and tick-size, 
however, are expected to have a negative association with the level of information asymmetry. 
Similarly, the strategic trading-behavior of informed traders (Kyle (1985)) should be reflected in 
a negative association between the level of information asymmetry and large drops in liquidity, 
such as large increases in bid-ask spreads. 
Chalmers and Kadlec (1998) find that the asset characteristics of a firm are also important 
in determining how the stock of a firm is traded. Therefore, firm-specific structural characteris-
tics, reflecting asset characteristics and operating conditions constitute another set of factors that 
potentially influence the information environment and hence the level of information asymmetry 
public investors face. The more the public knows about a firm, the less scope there is for informa-
tion asymmetry to arise. One rough measure of public exposure is firm size, which has already 
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been shown to be negatively related to the informativeness of stock-trades (Hasbrouck (1991a, 
1991b)). As investors in large firms have more sources of information that get more frequently 
updated than the information that investors in small firms have (Bushan (1989a)) and small firms 
tend to suffer from insider trading (Lakonishok and Lee (2001)), one would expect information 
asymmetry to decrease in firm size.  
The difficulty to derive a firm’s risk and expected return from its assets is another factor 
that determines the scope better informed investors have in exploiting their informational advan-
tage. There has been some empirical evidence that intangible assets, for instance, have a highly 
uncertain payoff (Kothari, Laguerre, and Leone (2002)) and are difficult to value for company-
outsiders (Cotter and Richardson (2002)). This suggests that the more intangible assets a firm 
has, the more incentives there are to acquire additional, private information and to exploit the re-
sulting information asymmetry in the financial markets. This suggests that one should expect 
information asymmetry to increase in the relative level of intangible assets. 
Firms could reduce information asymmetry by providing guidance on how their results 
should be interpreted. There is only a thin line, however, between making investors more knowl-
edgeable and managing perceptions, for instance in order to avoid negative earnings surprises. 
Rather than giving an objective interpretation of its situation, a firm may create information 
asymmetry by managing investors’ perception into a desired direction. Those investors that are 
able to identify such window-dressing may therefore have a more objective set of information 
and therefore be at an information advantage to the general public. It has been shown empirically 
that this window-dressing is most common at small, profitable firms with growth options (Ma-
tsumoto (2002)). In addition, growth firms that manage the perception of their investors tend to 
have a high book-to-market ratio (Bhattacharaya, Black, Christensen, and Mergenthaler (2004)). 
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Company-insiders (Aboody, Hughes, and Liu (2004); Lakonishok and Lee (2001)) and 
company-outsiders (Maug (2002)) seem to exploit their information advantage. In addition, the 
larger the ownership stake, the higher the level of information asymmetry should be as this class 
of informed investors may get additional price-relevant information, by, for instance, being repre-
sented on a company’s board of directors (Maug (2002)). On the other hand, outside shareholders 
may improve the communication with financial markets (Bushee and Noe (2000)), which there-
fore makes the role of the ownership structure in determining the level of information asymmetry 
investors face in the financial markets an empirical issue. Finally, it has been shown that inves-
tors exploit information asymmetry by means of options (Easley et al. (1998)). The higher lever-
age of options relative to stocks could make informed traders prefer these instruments. The real-
ized level of information asymmetry in the stock market should therefore be lower if options are 
traded as some of the informed traders move to the options market. 
In sum, we hypothesize that the level of information asymmetry measured in the stock 
market is lower the larger the firm, the more measurable (tangible) its assets, the lower its pro-
pensity to window-dress, and if there are options written on its stock.  
Whether investors care about the existence of information asymmetry can ultimately be 
looked into when testing for whether exposure to information asymmetry is a priced risk factor. 
Typically, the justification for information asymmetry to be a priced risk-factor is based on the 
difficulty to diversify it away (Aboody, Hughes, and Liu (2004)) as it is one-sided – the unin-
formed al-ways loses out to the informed trader. If non-diversifiability is the only factor that 
gives rise to the information risk-premium, this effect should be more pronounced the stronger 
the common variation in information asymmetry as a rising level in information asymmetry in 
one stock would not be offset by reductions in another.  
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The informativeness of prices can be increased – and hence the information risk-premium 
be reduced – by trades of informed investors who impound their information into prices. Ob-
served security prices may be used by public investors to complement their information set (e.g., 
see Habib, Johnsen, and Naik (1997) and Admati and Pfleiderer (2000) for theoretical models 
where the public investor uses security prices to improve her information set). This implies that 
informed trading, which helps impounding previously private information into prices, makes this 
information public and therefore help the uniformed update their information set (Easley and 
O’Hara (2004)). This implies that the stronger common variation is in information asymmetry, 
the better one can assess the actual level of information asymmetry. This allows the public inves-
tor to better differentiate between true changes in fundamental value and random price fluctua-
tions. Therefore, it is also possible that the information risk-premium declines the stronger com-
mon factors are. As both could effects co-exist, it is an empirical issue whether the most impor-
tant source of the information risk-premium is rather due to the inability to diversify or to the in-
ability to forecast the information environment. Specifically, the return relevance of the system-
atic common-factor dependent component of informed trading and the return relevance of the re-
sidual asymmetric information, RAIN, is tested. These hypotheses are summarized in Table 1. 
3 Methodology 
3.1 Measuring Informed Trading 
One of the measures used is the popular PIN (labeled PIN1 hereafter) developed and empirically 
tested in, for instance, Easley, et al. (1997b). Assuming a unit trade size and uninformed trades to 
occur randomly, the trading session is modeled as a hazard process of informed and uninformed 
trades. Private information may be revealed to the informed investor at the beginning of each 
trading session only. The basic assumption is that informed trades reflect this private information 
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by being either exclusively buys or sales depending on the context of the private information. The 
trade direction of uninformed investors is assumed to fluctuate randomly between buys and sells. 
The resulting daily number of buys and sells serves as the empirical input of the model. The es-
timated coefficients of the theoretical model are used to calculate PIN1 over a set of T trading 
days.9 Many empirical studies use PIN1 (see, e.g., Easley, et al. (2002); Odders-White and Ready 
(2006); Vega (2006)), which shows that this measure is well behaved and yields intuitive results. 
One of the disadvantages of this measure is, however, that it is estimated over many trading ses-
sions, which makes it less suited for identifying short-lived changes in the information environ-
ment. One could, however, adjust the estimation of PIN1 such that PIN1 is available on a higher 
frequency. The computational difficulties encountered when empirically estimating PIN1, how-
ever, makes the use of the publicly available PIN1 data estimated over a one-year horizon more 
appear most reliable.10 
To make up for this shortcoming of PIN1, informed trading is alternatively estimated by 
the daily average loss of liquidity suppliers to traders demanding liquidity. As this loss should, on 
average, be zero in the absence of information asymmetry, this direct measure of adverse selec-
                                                 
9 More specifically, the daily number of buy transactions, Bt, and sell transactions, St, on day t are used as input to 
the daily likelihood function, Lt: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )s bb s b sS BB S B Ss bb s b s, 1 e e e e 1 e e ,
B! S! B! S! B! S!t t t
L B S − µ+ε − µ+ε−ε −ε −ε −ε
µ + ε µ + εε ε ε εθ = − α + αδ + α − δ  
where θ is the parameter vector defined as θ = (α, µ, εb, εs, δ), α denotes the probability of an information event to 
occur and indicating a drop in asset value with probability δ. The resulting information-based orderflow is denoted 
by µ, uninformed sell transactions are denoted by εs and uninformed buy transactions are captured by εb. Maximum 
likelihood estimate of the individual coefficients that are part of parameter vector θ are calculated via the product of 
Lt over T days. Subsequently, the following relationship is used to derive PIN1: 
s b
.1PIN
αµ= αµ + ε + ε  
10 These problems have also been documented by Easley, Engle, O'Hara, and Wu (2001), Easley, Hvidkjaer, and 
O'Hara (2004), and Vega (2006), which is essentially a truncation error that arises from the fact that the software 
used for the maximum likelihood estimation reaches its numerical limit. Re-arranging the likelihood function (results 
not shown to preserve space but available on request from the authors) show that these problems occur when the 
number of transactions is fairly high or if the estimated parameter µ , which is the imputed level of informed order-
flow, is large relative to the uninformed orderflow, ε. 
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tion results in a numerical estimate of the level of informed trading during a trading session. This 
variable, labeled IA1, captures the total loss to informed traders by liquidity suppliers, who, on 
average, can be presumed to have all publicly available information. Huang and Stoll (1996) cap-
ture this loss by the difference between the quote mid-point, defined as the sum of the bid and ask 
quotes divided by two, at the time of the transaction and the re-corded transaction price a fixed 
time later. Bessembinder and Kaufman (1997) use the difference of the transaction price and the 
quote mid-point a fixed time interval later divided by the quote mid-point at the time of the trans-
action. Naik and Yadav (2003b) replace transaction prices by the quote mid-point and thereby 
address problems related to the bid-ask bounce and unequally spaced transaction times (see, e.g., 
Lease, Masulis, and Page (1991)). Hasbrouck and Sofianos (1993) also use a similar measure. 
Daily averages of this variable are robust and provide estimates at a sufficiently high frequency. 
At a transaction level, IA1 is defined as: 
( )1, ,t t T t tIA D M M M= −      (1) 
where Dt is a trade direction indicator taking a value of +1 for a buy transaction and –1 for a sell 
transaction, Mt and MT are the quote mid-points at the time of the transaction, t, and some time, T, 
later. To account for variation in the time horizon new information is impounded into prices, IA1 
is estimated over 15 minutes, 30 minutes, 60 minutes, and over one day.11 Taking daily value-
weighted averages allows the inclusion of trade size as an additional variable that accounts for 
private information.12 Following Bessembinder and Kaufman (1997), quotes posted at least five 
                                                 
11 IA1 over one day is calculated using MT in effect at the exact same time of the day than Mt but one trading day later. 
One could calculate IA1 also over longer horizons to capture information that takes even longer than one day to be 
reflected in stock prices. The link between the information contained in a particular transaction at time t and the asset 
value some time later strongly weakens the more trading sessions one considers as new additional information gets 
revealed that may not be known to the trader that submitted her transaction at time t. 
12 Employing the Lee and Ready (1991)-algorithm to infer the trade-direction used in the calculation of IA1 be prob-
lematic as measurement errors induced by the Lee and Ready (1991)-algorithm may in some way be correlated with 
the error of IA1 to quantify the level of informed trading. As equity markets data are used, one still needs to infer the 
trade-direction to calculate alternative measures of informed trading, such as orderflow (see Ellis, Michaely, and 
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seconds before the reference trade are used.13 The comparison of estimates of this information 
asymmetry variable with similarly defined variables used in previous studies and some simple 
time-series diagnostics show that the IA1 values have reasonable characteristics.14 
A third group of well-established measures of informed trading use the serial covariance 
of quote mid-points (see Huang and Stoll (1997) for an overview of these models within a unify-
ing framework).15 The advantages of the covariance-based measures of informed trading do not 
seem to offset their empirical shortcomings, however, due to the following methodological weak-
nesses. First, the estimation procedure of informed trading is fairly resource intensive.16 Second, 
                                                                                                                                                              
O'Hara (2000) for a discussion of commonly used trade-direction algorithms). In addition, Froot and Ramadorai 
(2005) show that orderflow does not exclusively measure informed trades but that it affects prices via uninformed 
portfolio-balance and liquidity effects. This paper tries to account for the private information contained in orderflow. 
First, daily averages of IA1 are weighted by the U.S. dollar trading volume associated with each transaction. Second, 
PIN1 is based on orderflow. Both should give orderflow, which Evans and Lyons (2004), for instance, identify to be 
an important vehicle of value-relevant information in the foreign exchange market, considerable weight in the em-
pirical set-up. 
13 Outliers are cleaned by excluding the first half-hour of the trading day, IA1 observations larger than ten percent 
(Huang and Stoll (1996)), and those eight standard deviations away from the daily stock-level average. In addition, 
the daily top and bottom 0.1 percentiles are deleted to minimize the influence of extreme observations. 
14 The 29.7 basis points reported by Bessembinder and Kaufman (1997) for an equally-weighted average over 24 
hours is close to the 22.8 basis points of the average IA1 calculated the same way. The values reported in Huang and 
Stoll (1996) and Bessembinder (2003a, b) are also very similar if appropriate adjustments, such as dividing by the 
average quote mid-point, are made. Finally, average auto-correlation of IA1 is only significant for first order auto-
correlation, strongly decreasing in the time interval between Mt and MT and in firm size. The only significant AR(1) 
coefficients are for the time intervals of 15 minutes with medians (t-values) of 0.08 (1.90). 
15 Building on Glosten and Milgrom (1985), these models specify that market makers adjust quotes in response to 
changes in fundamental values, to expectations of future adverse selection losses, and to changes in the costs of car-
rying inventory. Researchers define changes in fundamental values to follow a white noise process and infer in-
formed trading as the fraction of quote changes unexplained by a simple inventory model. The inventory model, typi-
cally based on Ho and Stoll (1981), assumes market makers to passively respond to orderflow by adjusting bid 
quotes downward and ask quotes upward after an incoming transaction that is seller or buyer initiated, respectively. 
These models typically infer the effective spread as twice the square root of minus the auto-covariance of transaction 
price changes Roll (1984). Glosten (1987) is among the first models to decompose the spread into inventory man-
agement and adverse selection components. This model is developed further in George, Kaul, and Nimalendran 
(1991), for instance, who adjust stock-price changes by estimated changes in the expected return. 
16 Huang and Stoll (1997) use 20 stocks during the year 1991, a year where the amount of data to be processed was 
likely much lower than today (see, e.g., Easley, et al. (2004) for a discussion of the increase in intra-day activity over 
time and the associated computational problems). The empirically simpler model by George, et al. (1991) has its own 
practical difficulties. As large orders are often broken up into successively executed smaller ones, positive auto-
correlation in stock returns poses a significant problem (Harris (1990)). Neal and Wheatley (1998) report the level of 
in-formed trading to monotonically increase in the data sampling frequency when the George, et al. (1991)-measure 
is used. Our own calculations (unreported but available on request from the authors) lead to similar conclusions. This 
evidence make the George, et al. (1991)-measure not sufficiently reliable to be used here. By contrast, the data set 
used in this paper contains daily stock-level observations of around 1,500 individual stocks covering eleven years of 
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the underlying inventory model assumes that the only statutory obligation of market makers con-
sists of accommodating incoming trades, which does not reflect the situation of the market-maker 
on the NYSE, the stock market of interest.17 Third, additional factors are likely to influence mar-
ket makers’ trading and quote-setting behavior.18 This evidence suggests that the quote-setting 
behavior of market makers on the NYSE is more complex than suggested by the simple inventory 
model that underlies the covariance-based measures of informed trading. By contrast, IA1 is inde-
pendent of the potential trade motivations and market makers’ trade motivation as it only relies 
on the average profit generated from a transaction over a fixed time-interval. Given the compara-
tively high costs of estimating covariance-based measures of informed trading, the set of infor-
mation measures is limited to PIN1 and IA1 as these variables are less costly to acquire calculate 
or have simpler and more robust structural assumptions as compared to the covariance-based 
measures. 
3.2 Systematic Variation of Informed Trading 
To capture variation of informed trading related to market-wide commonality, the stock-level 
trading environment, and to firm-specific structural characteristics, the level of informed trading 
is regressed on the set of explanatory variables as discussed in Section 2. The regression analysis 
is divided into three parts as this allows examining how the step-wise removal of explained vari-
ance of informed trading affects excess returns.19 For this purpose, informed trading alternatively 
                                                                                                                                                              
a time period that is likely to contain more individual trade observations than the data set of the studies mentioned 
above. 
17 Market makers quote-setting behavior on the NYSE has to account for additional obligations, however, such as 
price-continuity (NYSE (2006)). This commitment seems to significantly affect market makers’ quote-setting behav-
ior and profitability (Panayides (2004)). 
18 These influences include competition for orderflow with regional exchanges, the risk-preferences, capitalization, 
and costs of capital of market markers, and cross-subsidization of income generated from active stocks to support 
losses made on inactive ones (Cao, Choe, and Hatheway (1997)). Market makers may even adjust their quotes to 
exploit their private information derived from the order book (Ready (1999)). 
19 Alternatively, one could relate informed trading to its explanatory variables in one single regression. This proce-
dure does not allow, however, examining how the step-wise removal of explained variation of informed trading af-
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captured by PIN1 or IA1, is first regressed on the set of market-wide commonality variables and 
variation explained by these variables is subsequently removed.20 This procedure is repeated us-
ing stock-level trading characteristics and firm-level structural characteristics until the three 
sources of common variation of informed trading are taken out of informed trading. Each regres-
sion has a firm-specific intercept. Accordingly, the first regression, used to investigate the pres-
ence of common market-wide components in informed trading, is specified as: 
1, , ,0 1 2 3 4 , ,i t i i tInfoTrade MBA MVOL MVLA MOIBβ β β β β ε= + + + + +    (2) 
where InfoTrade1,i,t alternatively denotes PIN1 or IA1 of stock i on day t and the variables MBA,  
MVOL, MVLA, and MOIB are the daily market-level bid-ask spread, U.S. dollar trading volume, 
                                                                                                                                                              
fects excess returns. Computations are done both ways. The method used does not greatly affect the sign, magnitude, 
and significance of the estimated regression coefficients. 
20 The order in which regressions (2) to (6) are estimated is arguably arbitrary. The main theme behind the order cho-
sen in the current set-up is that we go from the general (market-wide variation) to the specific (stock-level trading 
characteristics or firm-level structural characteristics) and from time-series level variation captured by the trading 
environment (market-wide and stock-level trading characteristics) to cross-sectional variation captured by the firm-
level structural characteristics. One weakness of this approach (instead of putting all variables into the same regres-
sion) is that the estimates may suffer from an omitted variable bias (at least to a larger degree than if the regression 
would be estimated in one go including all of our right-hand side variables). Estimating these regressions in one go 
hardly affects the sign and the significance of the estimates, but does not allow showing the change in loading of 
information asymmetry when used in the regression set-up discussed in Section 5.5. We therefore use the current 
three-step format. 
Nevertheless, we attempt to empirically verify whether the order of the regressions as spelled out in this section is 
supported by the data, i.e., that it reflects roughly the explanatory power of the variables. We therefore estimate a 
step-wise regression where for each number of right-hand side variables (i.e., from one to eighteen variables), those 
who best explain information asymmetry as measured by the maximum R2 are retained. For this exercise to be most 
meaningful in terms of capturing variation in information asymmetry and extending its validity also to Section 5.5, 
information asymmetry is measured by daily IA1. The step-wise regression is estimated on daily IA1 measured over 
15 minutes, 30 minutes, 60 minutes, and 1 day by size decile with a general intercept (i.e., no firm-specific one) to 
focus on the explanatory power of the individual right-hand side variables. Results show that the variables capturing 
information asymmetry best are the market-wide and stock-level trading characteristics. Firm size only occasionally 
features as the third or fourth most important variable across all time-horizons and size deciles. From this exercise, it 
generally emerges that bid-ask spreads, volatility, and – for the one-day horizon – order-imbalance are the most im-
portant variables (which is consistent with what is reported in Section 5.6). For smaller firms, the stock-level meas-
ures are most important, whereas for larger firms, market-level bid-ask spreads and volume tend to be the most im-
portant variables. This shows that the order in which the regression are run may roughly correspond to the empirical 
importance of the variables, which implies that potential effects from the omitted variable bias resulting from esti-
mating the regression in three steps rather than in one go is limited. Results also show, however, that stock-level 
trading characteristics are at least as important as market-wide trading characteristics in explaining observed infor-
mation asymmetry. One could therefore first regress information asymmetry on stock-level trading characteristics, 
then on market-wide commonality factors, and then on firm-level structural characteristics. The estimated regression 
coefficients of these regressions are hardly different from what is reported in Table 5 (see also footnote 35). 
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volatility, and order-imbalance, respectively. The market-wide component is subsequently taken 
out of InfoTrade1,i,t by calculating InfoTrade2,i,t defined as: 
( )2, , 1, 1 2 3 4ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ .i t tInfoTrade InfoTrade MBA MVOL MVLA MOIBβ β β β= − + + +    (3) 
InfoTrade2,i,t is subsequently related to firm-level variables. The relationship between stock-level 
trading characteristics and informed trading is investigated by the following regression: 
2, , ,0 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 ,
5 , 6 , , ,
i t i i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t
InfoTrade VLA BA OIB TIC
UEDSpread VOL
γ γ γ γ γ
γ γ η
= + + + + +
+ +      (4) 
where VLA, BA, OIB, TIC, UEDSpread, and VOL are stock-level volatility, bid-ask spread, order-
imbalance, tick size, unexpected changes in the bid-ask spread, and trading volume, respectively. 
Variation attributable to stock-level trading characteristics is taken out by calculating: 
(
)
3, , 2, , 1 , 2 , 3 ,
4 , 5 , 6 ,
ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ .
i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t




= − + + +
+ +    (5) 
InfoTrade3,i,t is used to investigate the relationship between structural characteristics and informa-
tion environment:  
3, , ,0 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 ,
5 , 6 , 7 , 8 , , ,
i t i i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t i t
InfoTrade Insider Outsider Capex R & D
BTM Profit Options Size
δ δ δ δ δ
δ δ δ δ ξ
= + + + + +
+ + + +    (6) 
where Insider, Outsider, Capex, R&D, BTM, Profit, Options, and Size denote the fraction of 
common stocks held by corporate insiders and outsiders, capital expenditures, R&D expenses, 
the book to market ratio, the profit margin, and an indicator for the availability of exchange-
traded options on stock i. To investigate whether the absence of a relationship between informed 
trading with variables that capture the environment of a firm is what specifically exposes the in-





, 3, , 1 , 2 , 3 ,
4 , 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 ,
ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ,
i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t i t
RAIN InfoTrade Insider Outsider Capex
R & D BTM Profit Options Size
δ δ δ
δ δ δ δ δ
= − + + +
+ + + +
   (7) 
where RAINi,t denotes the unexplained residual part of informed trading of firm i on day t. It 
represents the observed level of informed trading that deviates from what the public investor ex-
pects given the market environment, the stock-level trading environment, and features that char-
acterize each particular firm. As informed trades based on insider information should not show 
co-variation across stocks, RAIN is likely to capture informed trading that is most strongly asso-
ciated to insider trades. 
4 Data Sources 
Except for PIN1, which is in yearly frequency, and return data, which are kept in monthly fre-
quency, all other variables are expressed in daily frequency to improve variable-synchronicity. 
Intra-day data are from TAQ and cover the period between the 2nd of January 1995 and the 30th of 
December 2005. From the data sample excluded are REITs, ADRs, ADSs, closed-end funds, 
convertibles, preference shares, multiple classes of shares, warrants, rights issues, certificates, 
and stocks with less than 60 days of quotes or trades per calendar year. Stocks with a price below 
one U.S. dollar at the end of a calendar year are also excluded to ensure a minimum level of li-
quidity and avoid undue influence of the discrete price grid. Trades at the market open, trades out 
of sequence, trades with special settlement conditions, trades outside the market opening times, 
or trades that have been corrected are all purged, as are quotes that are posted during the market 
open, quotes that are negative, or quotes that lead to a bid-ask spread that is either negative, 
above five U.S. dollars, or larger than 40 percent of the transaction price.21 The sample is con-
fined to stocks traded on the NYSE as primary market. Data from regional exchanges can be un-
                                                 
21 These cleaning procedures are common for these data (see, e.g., Chordia, et al. (2000)). 
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reliable for stocks that have their primary listing on the NYSE (Odders-White and Ready (2006)). 
Therefore, daily time-weighted averages of the best bid and offer (hereafter BBO) quotes are cal-
culated using NYSE data only. The trade direction is inferred using the Lee and Ready (1991)-
algorithm, which matches trades with quotes posted at least five seconds before this trade is exe-
cuted. This data item is used to calculate, for instance, raw order-imbalance as the net of U.S. 
dollar volume bought and sold each day. 
Monthly and daily stock returns, closing stock prices, value-weighted market-returns, the 
number of shares outstanding, four-digit SIC codes, and the daily share volume are retrieved 
from CRSP. Using these data, stock-level volatility is calculated as the squared daily return,22 and 
tick size is defined as the inverse of the closing stock price.23 U.S. dollar volume is calculated as 
the product of the closing stock price and share volume, and firm size is defined as the daily 
product of the closing stock price and the number of shares outstanding. The Fama and French 
(1995)-factors SMB and HML and the one-month Treasury bill rate are from the Fama-French 
data-base on WRDS. The Blockholders data set by Dlugosz, Fahlenbrach, Gompers, and Metrick 
(2006) on WRDS is used to calculate corporate insider ownership as the sum of the percentage of 
common stock held by executives, directors, and affiliated entities. Ownership by corporate out-
siders is defined as the fraction of common stock held by anyone who is neither affiliated nor 
employed by the respective firm. Values of PIN1 are from Soeren Hvidkjaer’s homepage.24  The 
data to calculate profit margins, the ratios of book value to market value, R&D expenses to sales, 
                                                 
22 An alternative volatility proxy is the sum of the squared intra-day returns. Using this definition may potentially 
lead to methodological problems in our case as our sample includes some stocks that are not traded sufficiently fre-
quent. 
23 Tick size measures the size of the minimum price-increment and therefore the resolution of the price-grid. For in-
stance, a stock priced at $5 has a minimum possible price-increment of 1 cent (or $1/8 prior to the decimalization of 
NYSE prices) corresponding to 0.002 (0.025) of its price. A stock priced at $200 has a minimum possible price in-
crement corresponding to 0.00005 (0.000625) of its price, which suggests that the price-grid of the stock priced at 
$200 is finer than the price-grid of a stock priced at $5. 
24 We would like to thank Soeren Hvidkjaer for making the PIN1 data available on his website: 
http://www.smith.umd.edu/faculty/hvidkjaer/data.htm. 
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and capital expenditures to sales are from COMPUSTAT, whereby COMPUSTAT data are win-
sorized at the first top and bottom percentile.25 The options-availability indicator, based on the 
Ivy DB database of Option Metrics, is one if options on the common stock of a firm are regis-
tered on an exchange in the U.S. on a particular day and zero otherwise. 
Order-imbalance is defined as the sum of the intercept and the residual of a regression of 
the ratio of absolute daily raw U.S. dollar imbalance to daily U.S. dollar volume on U.S. dollar 
trading volume. The volume data that are further used in the empirical analysis are defined as the 
residuals of a regression of changes in U.S. dollar volume on market volume, stock-level volatil-
ity, and market returns (see Chordia, et al. (2000) for a similar set-up): 
2
0 1 2 1 3 , 4 , 1 5 ,$ ,t t t m t m t i t tVolume MVolme MVolume r r rϑ ϑ ϑ ϑ ϑ ϑ τ− −= + + + + + +    (8) 
where $Volumet is the percentage change in U.S. dollar volume from the previous trading day to 
day t, rm,t and ri,t are the return on the market and on stock i over the same period, and MVolumet 
is the equally-weighted market average of stock-level percentage changes in U.S. dollar volume 
from the previous day to day t. Defining volume this way improves the comparability of volume 
across stocks and removes the time-trend in U.S. dollar volume. Similarly, regression (8) is esti-
mated by replacing Volume and MVolume by the daily percentage changes in bid-ask percentage 
spreads and the market average of changes therein. The residual of this regression is labeled 
UEDSpread, and represents the unexpected change in bid-ask spreads, which serves as our proxy 
for large changes in bid-ask spreads.26 
                                                 
25 These variables are operating profits (item 13), total sales (item 12), the necessary items to calculate book value 
excluding preference shares (items 60, 74, and 208 less items 56, 175, and 130), R&D expenses (item 46), and capi-
tal expenditures (item 128). Firms with negative book values are excluded. Missing values from COMPUSTAT and 
the Blockholders database are set to zero. Results are insensitive to these data cleaning procedures. 
26 The estimated coefficients of this regression are very close to what Chordia, et al. (2000) report with and without a 
lead-term. The intercepts are insignificant with average p-values of 0.23 and 0.38 for volume and bid-ask spreads, 
respectively. 
  22
Market-level bid-ask spread, trading volume, and order-imbalance are defined as the value-
weighted averages of the stock-level values. The new methodology VIX index is used to measure 
market-volatility.27 The merged data set contains 2,407 individual firms that have valid observa-
tions for all data-items, with each year having between 1,287 and 1,641 individual firms. 
Summary statistics of the data are shown in Table 4. Mean values of unexpected changes 
in bid-ask spreads are around zero, which is as expected given the definition of this variable as a 
regression residual. The mean book-to-market ratio is very close to what other studies, such as 
Easley, et al. (2002), report. Most of the variables exhibit some degree of skewness and a strong 
size-effect. The value-weighted market average of bid-ask spreads, for instance, is much smaller 
than the simple mean of the stock-level equivalent, showing that small firms have a much larger 
bid-ask spread than large firms. Many other empirical market microstructure studies rescale the 
input data to improve their distributional characteristics. Rescaling the variables has the addi-
tional benefit of making cross-sectional comparisons more meaningful Naik and Yadav (2003a). 
Therefore, the variables that are meant to capture market-wide commonality, stock-level trading 
characteristics, and firm-specific structural characteristics are rescaled using the non-parametric 
method of normal scores, which replaces the respective variable value by its ranking scaled by 
some factor.28 Thereby, data referring to market-wide commonality and stock-level trading char-
                                                 
27 The new methodology VIX index is downloaded from the website of the CBOE: 
 http://www.cboe.com/micro/vix/introduction.aspx. 
It is the implied volatility of near-to-expiry options on the S&P 500 index and thereby provides an ex ante forecast of 
expected future volatility. Our intention is to capture the markets’ concurrent information environment, which makes 
the VIX measure preferable to the backward looking past realization of volatility. Blair, Poon, and Taylor (2001) 
show that the VIX index has statistical properties equivalent to the actually realized market volatility, which provides 
confidence that VIX is a statistically sound measure. In addition, as these data is readily available, one avoids errors 
induced by calculating market-volatility from raw return data. 
28 Odders-White and Ready (2006), for instance, rescale their data using quartiles, and Brennan, Chordia, and 
Subrahmanyam (1998) normalize their data to a mean of zero and variance of one. Llorente, Michaely, Saar, and 
Wang (2001) use a non-parametric method to rescale their explanatory variables based on the relative ranking of 
each data point within the data-series considered. Taking the logarithm of the variables instead of rescaling is proba-
bly more common in empirical studies but requires the data to be strictly larger than zero. In addition, it implies a 
functional relationship (an exponential one) between informed trades and the explanatory variables, which cannot be 
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acteristics are rescaled within each time-series individually and the time-specific structural vari-
ables are rescaled daily across the cross-section.29 Table 2 summarizes the definitions of the em-
pirical measurements used in this study. 
5 Discussion of Results 
5.1 Univariate Analysis 
The correlation matrix presented in Table 3 gives a first impression of the co-variation between 
informed trading and the set of explanatory variables. The association of PIN1 with the explana-
tory variables is mostly consistent in sign with the association IA1 shows, suggesting that both 
measures of informed trading capture the same phenomenon. 
The variables that show the hypothesized relationship with informed trading are bid-ask 
spreads, volatility, order-imbalance, firm size, insider ownership, and option availability. The 
univariate association of informed trading with market-level trading volume, asset measurability 
(R&D and capital expenditures), and one of the proxies for active management of investor’s per-
ception (profit margin) is opposite to the hypotheses shown in Table 1. 
Amongst the associations that are considered empirical issues, higher unexpected bid-ask 
spreads and higher stock-level trading volume appear to be associated with a higher level of in-
formed trading. This implies that market makers are relatively sensitive to changes in the infor-
mation environment as higher levels of informed trading result in high bid-ask spreads. Informed 
traders seem to cluster when daily trading volume is high, probably to minimize trading costs, 
                                                                                                                                                              
motivated a priori in this context. A non-parametric method, such as the one used by Llorente, et al. (2001) therefore 
seems to us more appropriate for this study as it is explicitly free from any postulated relationship between informed 
trading and the explanatory variables. Re-scaling these data to a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one does 
not significantly alter the results. 
29 As a result, the mean, median, and interquartile range of the market-wide commonality variables are respectively 
between –0.18 and 0.16, around zero, and between 0.36 and 0.91. The mean, median, and interquartile range of the 
rescaled stock-level trading characteristics are all close to zero. The mean, median, and interquartile range of the 
rescaled firm-specific structural characteristics are between –0.17 and 0.07 between –0.79 and –0.05, and between 
0.24 and 1.45, respectively. 
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which extends the intra-day results of Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) to a daily horizon. The asso-
ciation of tick size implies that lower tick size, and a resulting more efficient price discovery 
process, leads to a lower level of informed trading. Finally, a higher level of outside ownership is 
associated with a lower level of informed trading, suggesting that outside parties that own large 
stakes in a firm improve the information flow to the financial markets as suggested by Bushee 
and Noe (2000). The strong size-effect in most of the explanatory variables makes one cautious, 
however, to attach too much importance to the univariate results, however. A multivariate analy-
sis is potentially more fruitful, which is implemented in the next section. 
5.2 Multivariate Analysis 
Using the methodological set-up discussed in Section 3.2, IA1 and PIN1 are regressed in three 
steps on the set of explanatory variables. To ensure comparability of the associations of IA1 and 
PIN1, both measures need to be in the same frequency. For that purpose, daily IA1 is expressed as 
yearly average, resulting in the same frequency than PIN1. Comparing IA1 with the widely used 
PIN1 serves as a consistency check to verify whether both variables capture the same phenome-
non of informed trading. Based on this evidence, one can assess the validity of extending the em-
pirical analysis of informed trading on data observed with daily frequency. Analyzing informed 
trading on daily frequency, which only IA1 allows, potentially yields richer results than the yearly 
frequency for variables that capture time-series variation on the market-level or the stock-level. 
Yearly averages of IA1 and the explanatory variables and implement the methodological set-up as 
discussed in Section 3.2. Results presented in Table 5 show consistent results between PIN1 (see 
Panels A and B of Table 5) and IA1 (see Panels A and C of Table 5). In what follows, it is spe-
cifically referred to either measure of informed trading in the discussion of Table 5 only if the 
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empirical associations of both measures with any of the explanatory variables differ from each 
other. 
5.2.1 Commonality in Informed Trading 
Results in Table 5 show a strong presence of commonality in informed trading, as all coefficients 
are highly significant.30 As hypothesized, higher levels of informed trading are associated with 
higher bid-ask spreads. Consistent with French and Roll (1986), high volatility is associated with 
a high level of informed trading. This suggests that during periods of price uncertainty, informed 
investors particularly exploit their knowledge. Order-imbalance has a positive association with 
informed trading, which is consistent with the univariate results. The association with volume 
that is negative for PIN1 and positive for IA1 likely reflects a size-effect, which is picked up by 
PIN1 but to a much lesser degree by IA1, as PIN1 has a stronger positive relationship with size 
than IA1 (see Table 3). Estimating this regression on a daily horizon likely helps addressing this 
issue as the higher observational frequency allows better controlling for size while giving more 
room for time-series variation to be reflected in the regression coefficients of this panel regres-
sion. 
Nevertheless, these results show a strong degree of commonality in informed trading. The 
findings support the argument put forward by Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001) that commonality in 
trading may be caused by informed investors acting on the same market-wide information. This 
implies that some of the observed level of informed trading is related to public, market-wide sig-
nals. For public information to be related to informed trading, it needs to be processed into some-
thing that is not yet known. Commonality in informed trades is therefore likely a reflection of in-
formation analysts mentioned by Kim and Verrecchia (1994, 1997), who generate private infor-
                                                 
30 The regressions are estimated for IA1 estimated over 15, 30, and 60 minutes and 24 hours. As the results are very 
similar, present only the results for the 60 minutes horizon. 
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mation, and hence cause informed trading, by interpreting publicly available data quicker and 
more effectively than the public investor. How the stock-level trading environment is related to 
informed trading is looked at next. 
5.2.2 Stock-level Trading Environment 
In a second step, informed trading where variation explained by market-wide variables has been 
taken out is regressed on stock-level trading characteristics. Results in Table 5 are consistent with 
the discussion in Section 5.1: Higher levels of volatility and bid-ask spreads are associated with 
higher levels of informed trading. The two bid-ask spread measures and trading volume make the 
strongest contribution to explain informed trading across all measures of information asymmetry 
whereby the strong association of PIN1 with order-imbalance likely reflects the fact that PIN1 is 
based on these data. The association of unexpected changes in bid-ask spreads and informed trad-
ing measured by PIN1 is opposite to what is found when IA1 is used. This may also mirror the 
way both measures of informed trading are calculated. PIN1 values are estimated over a full year 
and therefore seem to pick up the long-term effects that express the strategic cost-minimizing 
trading behavior of informed traders (see, e.g., Kyle (1985)) as the level of informed trading is 
lower when spreads are unexpectedly high. IA1, by contrast, is originally estimated over a much 
shorter horizon and may thus pick up the short-term relationship between bid-ask spreads and 
informed trading that is also found in the univariate setting: higher levels of informed trading 
cause market makers to widen the quoted bid-ask spreads, as suggested by Glosten and Milgrom 
(1985). 
The association of firm-level order-imbalance with informed trading measured by IA1 is 
similar to the one found at a market-level (not shown): if the horizon over which informed trad-
ing is measured, is getting longer, one observes the coefficient of order-imbalance to become lar-
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ger.31 The positive coefficient of tick size suggests that prices are more efficient with a smaller 
the minimum price increment as there seems to be less informed trading the smaller the size of 
the minimum tick. This is consistent with the improvement in price efficiency brought by the 
switch to decimal pricing on the NYSE that Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2005) report. 
The results do not support the hypothesis by Glosten and Milgrom (1985) related to volume as 
higher volume seems to be associated with a higher level of informed trading, consistent with the 
empirical findings of Bhushan (1989a) and Llorente, et al. (2001). 
5.2.3 Firm-specific Structural Characteristics 
Variation explained by stock-level trading characteristics is taken out of informed trading, which 
is subsequently regressed on firm-specific structural characteristics. Results, reported in Table 5, 
confirm most of the findings from the univariate analysis. Opposite to the hypotheses listed in 
Table 1 our expectation is the negative association between informed trading and R&D expenses, 
which may be explained by the relatively strong size effect in this variable (see Table 3). 
As anticipated, however, the level of informed trading declines with firm size. Looking at 
the association of ownership structure and informed trading, it turns out that informed trading in-
creases in the relative size of the ownership stake of insiders. Outsiders, however, seem to im-
prove the information environment, which is in line with the findings of Bushee and Noe (2000). 
The negative sign of the coefficient of the book-to-market ratio confirms the hypothesis that 
growth firms expose investors to a higher level of informed trading. This is consistent with Ma-
tsumoto (2002), who find that growth firms bias the information communicated to the public 
more than others. Another finding by Matsumoto (2002) is that loss-making firms are less likely 
                                                 
31 Untabulated results show the regression coefficient of stock-level order-imbalance to be insignificant if IA1 is es-
timated over two days and significantly negative if IA1 is estimated over three to five days. This reflects findings by 
Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2002) that information contained in order-imbalance is impounded into prices 
within few days and suggests that the link between the information environment in the stock market and stock prices 
quickly weakens when extending the measurement horizon beyond one day. 
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to manage the perceptions of their investors. This implies a negative relationship between the 
profit margin and the level of informed trading, which the results also support. Finally, the avail-
ability of options is related to a lower level of informed trading. This suggests that some in-
formed traders prefer trading in the options market. Consequently, uninformed investors in the 
market for common stocks with options are less exposed to informed trades than investors in 
comparable stocks without options. 
In sum, most of the hypothesized relationships between informed trading and the set of 
explanatory variables are supported by the data, although some of the results suggest a need for 
more precise proxies to better capture the relationship of, say, asset tangibility and the informa-
tion environment. To improve the analysis of potential causes for time-series variation in in-
formed trading, this analysis is repeated using higher frequency data. PIN1 is in yearly frequency. 
Thus, only IA1 can be used. As both measures of informed trading show very similar associations 
with the set of explanatory variables, it appears save to assume that IA1 captures the information 
environment sufficiently well to allow drawing general conclusions about informed trading from 
the following analysis. 
5.3 Daily Analysis of Informed Trading 
This section reports the results of re-estimating the regressions specified in Section 3.2 on daily 
frequency. To account for the strong size effect in the data, the regressions are estimated indi-
vidually by firm size deciles. Results are presented in Table 6.32 
The sign of the regression coefficients capturing the relationship between informed trad-
ing and market-wide commonality on a daily level is consistent with what is found on the yearly 
level (see Panel A of Table 6). The magnitude of the relationship between informed trading and 
                                                 
32 As before, only results where IA1 is estimated over 60 minutes are displayed. Results for IA1 estimated over differ-
ent intraday or daily horizons are hardly different. 
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market-level bid-ask spread and volume decreases monotonically in firm size. This implies that 
changes in the information environment due to innovations in the market environment are rela-
tively more important for small firms than for large ones. As small firms are generally less liquid, 
this implies that informed traders are fairly sensitive to stock market liquidity, which illustrates 
their strategic trading behavior postulated by Kyle (1985). Similarly, the size of the regression 
coefficients of market-level order-imbalance and stock-level order-imbalance (see Panel B of Ta-
ble 6) decreases in firm size. This suggests that smaller, less actively traded stocks need more 
time than the rest of the stock market to fully incorporate new information that triggered market-
wide changes in order-imbalance. This makes sense given that stock prices of small firms are 
typically less efficient in incorporating new information (Hasbrouck (1991)). The positive asso-
ciation of informed trading and market-level volatility shows that informed traders are more ad-
vantaged in periods of uncertainty. 
Another result in Table 6 is that the explanatory power of the regression monotonically 
increases in firm size if IA1 is estimated over short time horizons. Institutional investors tend to 
concentrate their investment in large firms rather than spread their investment across many 
smaller ones (Chordia and Subrahmanyam (2004); Farrar and Girton (1981)). Also, these inves-
tors tend to be more sophisticated than, say, retail investors (Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991)). It 
therefore seems that market-wide common variation in informed trading that likely originates 
from the Kim and Verrecchia (1994, 1997)-type informed analyst investors is the result of institu-
tional traders who exploit their superior skill in analyzing public information by trading stocks of 
large firms. This is also consistent with Lakonishok and Lee (2001), who find that most of insider 
trading, i.e., trading that arguably co-varies little across stocks as it typically relates to private in-
formation about firm-level idiosyncratic issues, is strongest and carries most information about 
small stocks. 
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The sign of the coefficient of tick size is negative (see Panel B of Table 6), which is op-
posite to the findings using yearly data. This may be explained by the difference in frequency, as 
more efficient prices imply a quicker price-response to new information, which the daily fre-
quency accounts for. The lower level of informed trading that results from more efficient prices is 
what information asymmetry measured on a yearly level captures. The smallest ten percent of the 
sample, however, do not show this relationship, however, which – given that smaller firms tend 
to be less price efficient and have a lower level of liquidity (Hasbrouck (1991)) – implies that 
small tick size may not be beneficial to the smallest, least liquid firms. Kairys, Kruza, and 
Kumpins (2000) find that the quality of the price-discovery process deteriorates for the least liq-
uid stocks in their sample as the trading process becomes more efficient via a switch from a daily 
batch auction to continuous pricing. The coefficient of tick size of the smallest ten percent of the 
sample could pick up a similar deterioration in the quality of the price discovery process, as the 
amount of information impounded into prices per time unit declines the lower the tick size. This 
relationship between price efficiency, informed trading, and liquidity could provide interesting 
insights to the discussion about the optimal minimum tick size. 
As some of the firm-specific structural variables are observed on a yearly frequency only, 
the associations between daily informed trading and firm-specific structural characteristics are 
considered to be of indicative nature only. Nevertheless, some variables show interesting associa-
tions. In particular, outside ownership, which on a yearly frequency is associated with a lower 
level of informed trading, now shows the opposite relationship. This could be interpreted as 
showing that large outside investors may exploit their preferential access to insider information, 
as Maug (2002), suggest. Given the findings on a yearly frequency, however, this seems unlikely 
as outside investors generally seem to improve investor’s communication (Bushee and Noe 
(2000)). Rather, these results are likely to show that large outside investors, which tend to be pro-
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fessional investment firms, are more skilled in analyzing public information than the average 
market participant. This is consistent with the empirical findings by Yan and Zhang (2007), who 
find that, what they call “short-term institutions”, exploit their information advantage, whereas 
“long-term” institutions do not. The results using yearly IA1 may therefore pick up the relation-
ship between informed trading and long-term investors and the relationship found for daily IA1 
likely captures the relationship between informed trading and short-term investors. 
More generally, the results so far suggest a market-wide commonality component in in-
formed trading. Stock-level characteristics that capture co-movements in informed trading over 
time and across stocks turn out to be related to the trading environment and structural characteris-
tics. The following section discusses the characteristics of the common component in informed 
trading. 
5.4 Analysis of Explained and Unexplained Informed Trading 
To further explore the characteristics of the information environment, it is calculated how much 
of the explained variation of informed trading is captured by market-wide commonality, stock-
level trading characteristics, or firm-level structural characteristics and whether the explanatory 
power is dependent on general features of the firm. Institutions are more likely to invest in large 
firms (Chordia and Subrahmanyam (2004); Farrar and Girton (1981)), which –  following the ar-
gument of the sophisticated, information generating investor – implies that informed trades by 
institutions should increase in relative importance with firm size. Therefore, market-wide com-
monality is likely to be relatively more important to explain informed trading for larger firms. 
Lower trading costs associated with more liquid stocks should enable Madrigal (1996)-
type traders who exploit their understanding of the trading environment, to publicly trade on their 
private information that is based on innovations of the stock-level trading environment. Therefore, 
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the importance of the trading environment in informed traders is expected to increase with liquid-
ity. However, as more liquid stocks are also more price-efficient, there should also be less scope 
for informed traders to exploit private information. Thus, trading characteristics could also be less 
important to informed traders of larger firms. 
Investors of small firms have less public information at their disposal (Bhushan (1989a)) 
and, as small firms are likely to have less diverse operations than large corporations (Agmon and 
Lessard (1997)), these investors are exposed to a higher level of risk. The economic prospects of 
smaller firms may thus be more strongly related to individual asset characteristics. Private infor-
mation about the value of these assets should be particularly valuable. Therefore, firm-level struc-
tural characteristics should be more important to explain informed trading when looking at small 
firms. 
Table 7, which shows the results of regressing IA1 on all variables plus an intercept on the 
stock-level, confirms most of these priors. About forty percent of explained variation of informed 
trading is associated with the market-wide component, slightly more than fifty percent of ex-
plained variation is attributed to the stock-level trading environment, and slightly less than ten 
percent of explained variation is attributed to firm-specific structural characteristics. The rela-
tively high level of importance of market-wide commonality and stock-level trading characteris-
tics seems to be the result of the use of daily IA1 data for this particular exercise, where time-
series variation likely dominates cross-sectional variation. Thus, more than half of the explained 
variation of informed trading is related to factors other than asset characteristics and a large pro-
portion of informed trading is explained by market-wide commonality. This is an interesting find-
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ing as empirical studies typically consider informed trading to be a firm-specific phenomenon 
(see, for instance, the references in footnote 4).33 
Moving from larger to smaller firms, unexplained variation of informed trading becomes 
more important (see Table 7). This reflects the particular importance of insider trades found for 
small firms (Lakonishok and Lee (2001)) that are unlikely to be functionally related to the envi-
ronment of investors, as argued previously. Ranking the relative explanatory power by other 
characteristics (not reported), such as the book-to-market ratio, the effective spread, or bid-ask 
spread exhibits very little variation in relative explanatory power across ranks. This implies that 
there is no systematic, functional relationship of these characteristics with the relative explana-
tory power of market-wide commonality, the stock-level trading environment, and firm-specific 
structural characteristics. 
The analysis so far has documented common variation in the level of informed trading 
next to unexplained residual variation, consistent with extant theory, intuition and, where avail-
able, prior empirical evidence. It still remains to be shown how much investors care about all this, 
i.e., whether and if so how informed trading, its explained part, and its unexplained component 
affect returns. This is looked at in the following section. 
5.5 Informed Trading and Stock Returns 
Easley, et al. (2002) show that exposure to informed trading is priced in the cross-section. This 
section investigate whether the presence of common variation in informed trading reduces the 
ability to diversify away exposure to informed trades and thereby increases the price-relevance of 
                                                 
33 Alternatively, the regression is estimated across the entire data panel by firm-size decile including all explanatory 
variables. Looking at the same horizon IA1 is estimated over than in Table 6, market-wide commonality factors cap-
ture between 14 (for the smallest decile) and 65 (for the largest decile) percent of the variance explained by the ex-
planatory variables. Stock-level trading characteristics account for between 55 (for the smallest decile) and 19 (for 
the largest decile) percent of the explained variance of IA1. As firm-level structural characteristics account for the 
remainder of the explained variance, we find numbers that are fairly close to the one reported in Table 6. 
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information risk. Alternatively, a strong relationship between the level of informed trading and 
variables that capture the information environment of investors could reduce information risk as 
price fluctuations could be more readily interpreted as being either random or a reflection of 
changes in fundamental values. This could be valuable to investors, as these seem to use prices as 
additional piece of information to derive the fundamental value (Admati and Pfleiderer (2000); 
Bhushan (1989a)). The former hypothesis implies that the total level of informed trading should 
have a stronger relationship with stock returns than unexplained level of informed trading, RAIN. 
The latter hypothesis implies the reverse. To improve the strength of the inferences drawn from 
this exercise, a variable that captures Explained Informed Trading, EXIT, is defined. This variable, 
calculated as the difference between total informed trading and RAIN, reflects informed trading 
explained by market-wide commonality, stock-level trading characteristics, and firm-specific 
structural characteristics. 
We test the relationship between returns and informed trading in the cross-section more 
formally by using a Fama and MacBeth (1973)-type set-up. The time-period covered by the data 
includes the period after 2000, which is characterized by a prolonged period of negative market 
returns. According to Potential and Sundaram (1995), negative excess market returns make the 
estimated loading on the beta-coefficient insignificant unless negative and positive market returns 
are separately considered in the cross-sectional regression. For this purpose, up-market (down-
market) market betas are defined as being equal to the stock-level beta if the realized market re-
turn in excess of the risk-free rate is positive (negative) and zero otherwise. To implement the 
regression, fifty portfolios are formed based on the average level of informed trading of the pre-
vious month. Stock returns in excess of the risk-free rate are average within each portfolio and 
regressed on the portfolio averages of beta, of the logarithm of the book-to-market ratio, and of 
the logarithm of firm size. The book-to-market ratio, firm size, and beta are measured as of the 
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previous year. The relevant value of informed trading is the level during the previous calendar 
year if PIN1 is used and the average level during the previous month if IA1 is used as measure of 
informed trading. This results in the following regression that is estimated every month: 
0 1 , 2 , 3 4 5 , ,
e
p up p down p p up k p tR BETA BETA Size BTM InfoTradeκ κ κ κ κ κ ζ= + + + + + +   (9) 
where epR  is the average portfolio return in excess of the risk-free rate of portfolio p. The vari-
ables BETAup,p and BETAdown,p are up-market and down-market betas of portfolio p, Sizep is the 
logarithm of firm size of portfolio p, and BTMp  is the logarithm of the book-to-market ratio of 
portfolio p, respectively. InfoTradek,p refers to the average level of informed trading-measure k of 
portfolio p. The monthly effective spread used as an alternative to InfoTradek to verify whether 
the relationship between informed trading and stock returns does not pick up liquidity effects that, 
as Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) find, may also be priced. Results are presented in Table 8 
using Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979)-adjusted t-statistics.34 
Intercepts are sometimes insignificant, showing that the model specified in regression (9) 
captures cross-sectional returns fairly well. Firm size is hardly significant though the negative 
regression coefficients reveal the size effect in stock returns, discussed in Fama and French 
(1992). The lack of statistical significance reflects the results of Kim (1995), who also finds firm 
size to be of little importance in explaining cross-sectional returns if data that cover time more 
recent time periods are used. The inclusion of the up-market and down-market betas turns out to 
be useful as the loadings are significant and signed as Potential and Sundaram (1995) suggest, 
while the use of one single beta variable (unreported) leads to insignificant coefficients. Consis-
tent with Easley, et al. (2002), the total unadjusted level of informed trading is priced in the 
cross-section. Most importantly, however, the association between excess returns and informa-
                                                 
34 The Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979)-adjustment is essentially a weighed least square estimate using the pa-
rameter precision as weight. Results are robust to the choice of the horizon over which IA1 is estimated. 
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tion risk gets economically and statistically stronger as one moves from total information asym-
metry to RAIN. This relationship weakens, however, the longer the horizon IA1 is estimated over. 
Loadings on EXIT are hardly statistically significant. The result is robust to whether RAIN is es-
timated in three steps as outlined in equations (2) to (7) or whether it is estimated in one go (re-
ferred to as RAIN2 in Table 8). This indicates that prices are an important source of information 
to investors as suggested by Admati and Pfleiderer (2000) and Bhushan (1989a). Therefore, in-
vestors seem to require a higher return the more they are exposed to an environment that does not 
allow discriminating between changes in fundamental value and random price fluctuations. 
To ascertain these results and to give more consideration to the relationship between re-
turns and informed trading over time, a second asset-pricing test is conducted. Cochrane (2001) 
discusses the trade-off between the empirical robustness of ordinarily least-square and the statis-
tical efficiency of generalized least-square (henceforth referred to as GLS) in asset pricing. Test-
ing the return relevance of the components of the information environment in a GLS framework 
could improve the validity of the results, as it is the most efficient way to adjust Fama-MacBeth 
regressions for biases and the errors-in-variables problem Ferson and Harvey (1999). Following 
the approach by Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996), a random intercept GLS regression model 
is used. In particular, individual stock returns are sorted into five portfolios based on firm size of 
the previous year. These portfolios are then individually sorted into five groups based on the av-
erage level of informed trading. Alternatively, a three-way sort on size, book-to-market, and in-
formed trading is used. Equally-weighted average portfolio excess returns are regressed on mar-
ket returns in excess of the risk-free rate, the Fama and French (1993)-factors SMB and HML, 
and the rank of each portfolio regarding its level of informed trading. The GLS regressions are 
run on the full data panel, whereby every portfolio has individual factor loadings for the market 
factor, the HML factor, and the SMB factor. The coefficient on the level of informed trading, 
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however, is estimated across all portfolios. This procedure results in a large number of explana-
tory variables, which therefore necessitates many time-series observations for a statistically valid 
estimation. The low sampling frequency of PIN1 results in relatively few time-series observations 
of this variable. Therefore, this particular asset-pricing test is done using monthly observations of 
IA1 only. 
The positive and significant slope coefficients of RAIN presented in Table 9 show that re-
turns are higher if exposure to informed trading that is unrelated to the environment of investors 
increases. In addition, the loadings on the ranking variable mostly increase in economic terms as 
one successively removes market-wide commonality, stock-level trading characteristics, and 
firm-specific structural characteristics of informed trading. EXIT is hardly related to returns, con-
firming the associations of the cross-sectional set-up presented in Table 8. 
These results show that exposure to informed trading is priced. In addition, it appears to 
be exposure to residual asymmetric information, RAIN, rather than total information asymmetry 
that captures the largest part of priced information risk. Thus, the reduced predictability of the 
information environment seems to be important to investors that they even attach a risk premium 
to the inability to use prices as additional source of information. 
5.6 Robustness Checks 
Several robustness checks are carried out to test the validity of the results. Regressions (2) to (6) 
on daily IA1 data are estimated within firm size quintiles and including day-of-the-week dummies. 
As informed trading is expressed by order-imbalance in many theories about the information 
flow in financial markets (see, e.g., Easley, et al. (2002); Kyle (1985); Lyons (2001)), several al-
ternative specifications of order-imbalance are included, too, such as lagged order-imbalance, 
dummies that account for the sign of order imbalance, and dummies that classify each daily 
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stock-level order-imbalance observation into one decile group based on the size relative to the 
rest of the cross-section. To investigate the stability of the coefficient estimates, regressions (2) to 
(6)  are re-estimated within sub-periods of the sample by slicing the time-series into two, three, 
and four partitions. 
Using firm size quintiles instead of deciles results in the same sign of the associations be-
tween the set of explanatory variables and informed trading. While the inclusion of day-of-the-
week dummies does not affect the sign or significance of the other explanatory variables, in-
formed trading appears to be higher at the beginning of the week. As Chordia, et al. (2002) find 
that the highest level of trading activity is at the beginning of the week, which therefore seems to 
be related to informed trading. Order-imbalance lagged by one day is positively related to in-
formed trading if IA1 is estimated over horizons shorter than one day. The coefficient of lagged 
order-imbalance is negative for larger firms and positive but insignificant for smaller ones if IA1 
is estimated over one day. This suggests that the information contained in order-imbalance is im-
pounded into prices within about one day. Running the regression in sub-periods shows estimates 
largely consistent with Table 6. However, regression coefficients of market-level volatility are 
mostly negative between 1995 and 1997 as are the coefficients of stock-level bid-ask spreads for 
the regressions estimated between 2003 and 2005. Both variables exhibit a consistent time-trend 
during these sub-periods, which the sub-period regression estimates seem to pick-up. Results of 
estimating regressions (2) to (6) in a different order is shown in Panel A of Table 10, which re-
veals that the resulting regression coefficients similar different from what is reported in Table 6.35 
                                                 
35 When reversing the order of the regression, we intend to minimize the potential for omitted variable bias that re-
sults from the particular order the regressions are estimated. In particular, we select an alternative order where the 
variables that may potentially explain more of the observed variation in IA1 than the market-wide trading characteris-
tics are come first, followed by the second most important set of variables and the remaining variables. Step-wise 
regressions reveal that stock-level trading characteristics could potentially be more important than market-wide trad-
ing characteristics in explaining observed variation in IA1 (see also footnote 20). This alternative estimation (i.e., 
using stock-level trading characteristics first, then market-wide trading characteristics, followed by firm-level struc-
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Finally, putting all explanatory variables into the same regression36 shows that the coefficients 
are hardly affected by the order of inclusion into the regression (unexpected changes in bid-ask 
spreads and some of the firm-level structural characteristics sometimes have different coefficients 
but the results appear to be fairly robust). 
The average information content of order-imbalance seems also to differ by trade direc-
tion. Buying pressure tends to be positively related to informed trading, while selling pressure is 
related to a lower level of informed trading. According to Aboody, Hughes, and Liu (2005) and 
Lakonishok and Lee (2001), this asymmetry could be due to buys involving a deliberate choice, 
potentially based on private information. Sales, however, additionally contain liquidity trades by 
employees that intend to divest stocks that are part of their compensation package (Aboody, et al. 
(2005); Lakonishok and Lee (2001)). Another potential reason for sales containing less informa-
tion than buys are mutual funds that liquidate stock-positions resulting from mergers or stock-
financed acquisitions by firms they are invested in (Harris (2003, p. 332)) and thereby became 
larger than their mandated maximum position. Consistent with theory (see, e.g., Kyle (1985)), the 
size of the daily order-imbalance position has a positive relationship with the level of informed 
trading. 
Further, it is tested whether IA1 captures the level of informed trading rather than simply 
daily returns. The main feature that distinguishes IA1 from simple returns is that it measures re-
turns conditional on a trade. A test of the validity of associating IA1 with informed trading – and 
not just returns – should therefore ascertain whether accounting for the timing of a transaction, as 
IA1 does, is useful in capturing the information environment. Thus, a return measure is con-
                                                                                                                                                              
tural characteristics) shows very similar results except for the a few stock-level variables (some of the coefficients of 
order-imbalance are now insignificant and negative and some of the coefficients of bid-ask spreads now contain 
some negative observations for larger firms), market-wide variables (market-wide volatility now contains some 
negative observations), and the firm-level structural characteristics. 
36 Results not shown to preserve brevity but available on request. 
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structed that accounts for the empirical characteristics of informed trading with its information 
environment but that excludes the information contained in the timing of a transaction. In particu-
lar, a hypothetical trader observes the daily realization of the explanatory variables. If this reali-
zation deviates from the historical (or cross-sectional) average, the trader takes a position of unit 
size that has the same direction than the deviation of the explanatory variable from its mean value 
and keeps this position for one day. Alternatively, the amplitude of the deviation from the histori-
cal or cross-sectional average to be reflected in the size of the position is considered.37 The result-
ing stock-level return-series is subsequently regressed on the explanatory variables using the 
same methodology and sectioning into size groups. Regardless of how this alterative return series 
is specified, the explanatory power of the regressions is very low (the R-square is between 0.004 
and 0.022). The associations with the explanatory variables are, although consistent in sign across 
size deciles, often insignificant. 
Another concern related to the use of IA1 is how strongly IA1 is influenced by return mo-
mentum. Therefore a time-series of daily 15-minutes unconditional quote returns is constructed. 
This return variable has the same set-up than IA1 except for explicitly not accounting for the in-
formation content of the timing of a trade. This variable should therefore mechanically pick up 
return momentum. If the relationship between this quote-return variable and the set of explana-
tory variables is weaker than what is found for IA1, one could conclude that IA1 contains more 
information than simply daily returns. Results shown in Panel B of Table 10 reveal that a regres-
                                                 
37 The first method multiplies the daily stock return from day t to the following day by the sum of the daily stock-
level indicator variables observed at the end of the previous day. Each indicator variable is defined as being equal to 
one if the de-meaned explanatory variable the indicator variable is referring to is larger than zero. It is equal to minus 
one if the respective de-meaned explanatory variable is negative. Market-wide commonality variables are de-meaned 
across time, stock-level trading characteristics are de-meaned across time for each stock individually, and firm-
specific structural variables are de-meaned every day across all stocks in the sample. The second method adds up all 
explanatory variables, which are standardized to a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one, for every stock and 
every day. The sum of the standardized explanatory variables of day t–1 is then multiplied by the daily stock return 
from day t to the following day. 
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sion of the quote-return series on the set of explanatory variables has a very low explanatory 
power (the average R-square across all size deciles is 3.2 percent). In addition, signs and the sig-
nificance of some explanatory variables are not always consistent across size decile. These tests 
show that IA1 cannot be replicated either using environmental variables observed in the recent 
past or mechanically by supplying returns over fixed intervals. Therefore, IA1 seems to reflect 
something that is not yet contained in prices: private information that is transmitted to the market 
by means of informed trades. We further test whether RAIN really constitutes a residual as is 
claimed in the analysis. For this purpose, we do a principal component analysis on the complete 
set of stock-level RAIN series.38 If RAIN truly represents a residual, one would expect not to find 
a principal component that captures much of the variance, e.g., in the vicinity of 30 percent, 
across the individual stocks. As PIN1 has only eleven time-series observations, its time-series 
variation does not have meaningful variation in the time-series to qualify for this test, which is 
why this test is only conducted using IA1. Results shown in Panel C of Table 10 confirm this 
prior. The first principal component does not capture more than 7 percent of the observed vari-
ance and the first three principal components together capture less than 12 percent of the ob-
served variance. Thus, RAIN seems to be mainly driven by firm-specific events and that the filter-
ing approach presented in this chapter has been successful in removing commonality in variation 
across stocks. 
6 Summary and Conclusions 
This paper analyses informed trading in about 1,500 reasonably liquid stocks traded on the NYSE 
between January 1995 and December 2005. One major contribution of this paper is to compre-
hensively investigate, for the first time, the relationship between informed trading and market-
                                                 
38 To ensure a sufficiently large time-series, only stocks that have observations at least 97.5 percent of time during 
the sample period have been used. 
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wide commonality, stock-level trading characteristics, and firm-specific structural characteristics. 
Results show strong evidence of market-wide commonality. Market-level volatility, trading vol-
ume, bid-ask spreads, and order-imbalance are all significantly related to the level of informed 
trading. These results, consistent with Kim and Verrecchia (1994, 1997), indicate a common, 
market-wide component in informed trading related to skilled information analysts who generate 
private information from public data. In addition, strong evidence of individual firm-specific fac-
tors in informed trading are reported. More than half of observed informed trading can be attrib-
uted to commonality and the stock-level trading environment. Most of the relationships between 
informed trading and our set of explanatory variables are consistent with economic theory, intui-
tion, and, where available, prior empirical evidence obtained using other measures and other em-
pirical approaches. 
Given the systematic influence of market-wide commonality and structural and trading 
characteristics of a firm, the level of informed trading unrelated to the environment an individual 
investor faces is calculated and referred to as Residual Asymmetric Information, or RAIN, associ-
ated with that firm at that time. We use this new measure to make another important contribution. 
Easley, et al. (2002) show that exposure to informed trading is priced in the cross-section of stock 
returns. The systematic relationship of informed trading with investors’ environment could in-
crease priced information risk as it lowers the ability to diversify away exposure to informed 
trades. Alternatively, a higher level of or whether a higher predictability of the level of informed 
trading helps uninformed investors in acquiring price-relevant information, thus lowering the re-
quired return of a stock. Results show that RAIN is priced in the asset’s required rate of return and 
its effect on returns is stronger and more robust than that of unfiltered informed trading. These 
results indicate that the inability to predict the information environment, and therefore the inabil-
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ity to distinguish information-induced price innovations from random price fluctuations, contrib-
utes significantly to the information risk premium. 
To address the inherent difficulty of attaching a numerical value to the information envi-
ronment by using two different measures of information asymmetry, which are fairly different in 
methodology, underlying theoretical assumptions, and sampling frequency. These empirical 
measures may be imprecise, however, which may be one of the major limitations of this study. In 
addition, eleven years of data constitute a fairly short time horizon from an asset pricing point of 
view, which may weaken the conclusions drawn from the respective part of this paper. The ro-
bustness checks shown in Section 5.6, however, supply some confidence that the results are suf-
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Table 1 – Hypothesized Relationship of Variables with Informed Trading 
This table shows the hypothesized associations between the explanatory variables and informed trading. The columns Measure and Variable Name indicate which 
measure is thought to interact with the level of informed trading and the name of the variable used to quantify this effect. The columns Sign and Hypothesis list the 
expected sign of the association of the respective variable with informed trading and the hypothesis the expectation is based on, respectively. The symbols “+” and “–” in 
the column Sign indicate that increases in the particular variable are expected to be associated with a higher or lower level of informed trading, respectively. 
 
 Measure Variable Name Hypothesis Sign 
Bid-ask spread MBA Bid-ask spreads are higher the higher the level of informed trades (Glosten and Milgrom (1985)).  + 
Trading volume MVOL Higher trading volume means trades are relatively less informed (Glosten and Milgrom (1985)). Higher volume results in rela-
tively noisy prices. This increases the benefit of private information (Bhushan (1989a)) that could also lead to more informed 
trades as informed traders hide among liquidity traders (Admati and Pfleiderer (1988)). 
+/– 
Volatility MVLA Private information drives return volatility (French and Roll (1986)).  + 
Market-wide com-
monality  
Order imbalance MOIB Private information is expressed via order-imbalance (Kyle (1985)).  + 
Bid-ask spread BA Bid-ask spreads are higher the higher the level of informed trades (Kyle (1985)).  + 
Unexpected changes in 
bid-ask spread 
UEDSpread Unexpectedly high bid-ask spreads imply an unanticipated drop in liquidity. As informed traders are strategic, the lower the li-
quidity, the lower the level of informed trades (Kyle (1985)). Alternatively, bid-ask spreads are unexpectedly high, so is informed 
trading as market makers increase spreads to protect themselves from informed trades (Glosten and Milgrom (1985)). 
+/– 
Trading volume VOL A higher trading volume means that trades contain less private information (Glosten and Milgrom (1985)). Higher volume results 
in relatively noisy prices, which increases the benefit of private information (Bhushan (1989a)), however, that could also lead to 
more informed trades as informed traders hide among liquidity traders (Admati and Pfleiderer (1988)). 
+/– 
Volatility VLA Private information drives return volatility (French and Roll (1986)).  + 
Tick size TIC Prices converge quicker to fundamental values the lower the minimum tick size (Chordia, et al. (2005)). The amount of informa-
tion revealed per time-interval should therefore increase the smaller the tick size. Alternatively, as a smaller minimum tick size 




Order imbalance OIB Private information is expressed via order-imbalance (Kyle (1985)).  + 
Public exposure Size Public investors in large firms have more sources of information that get more frequently updated than investors of smaller firms 
(Bhushan (1989a)). Small firms suffer more from insider trading (Lakonishok and Lee (2001)). 
– 
Profit + Active management of 
investor’s perception BTM 
Small firms with growth options (i.e., a lower book-to-market ratio, or BTM) bias investor communication more, and loss-making 
firms less (Matsumoto (2002)). If public information is biased, informed investors are advantaged. Therefore, profitability (Profit) 
and growth options are positively associated with informed trading. The growth firms that manage the perception of their inves-
tors are growth companies with a high BTM (Bhattacharya, Black, Christensen, and Mergenthaler (2004)). 
+/– 
R&D + Asset tangibility 
Capex 
Intangibles are difficult to value for outsiders (Cotter and Richardson (2002)) and their economic benefit is uncertain (Kothari, 
Laguerre, and Leone (2002)). Therefore, higher asset tangibility, as measured by the ratio of R&D-expenses to sales and capital 
expenses over sales, or Capex, should be associated with a lower level of informed trading. 
– 
Insider + Ownership structure 
Outsider 
Corporate insiders (Aboody, et al. (2005); Lakonishok and Lee (2001)) and outsiders (Maug (2002)) exploit their information 







Options Informed traders also use options (Easley, et al. (1998)). This could lead to a lower level of informed trading as some informed 
traders exploit their information via the options market. 
– 
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Table 2 – Variable Definitions 
This table lists the names of the variables used in this paper in column Variable Name and the definition used to construct the 
respective variable in the column Definition. 
 
Variable Name Definition 
IA1 The daily trade size-weighted average of the difference between the quote mid-point right before a transaction and 
the quote mid-point 15 minutes, 30 minutes, 60 minutes, or one day later scaled by the first quote mid-point. 
IA2 This variable is defined as IA1 less market-wide commonality. 
IA3 This variable is defined as IA2 less stock-level trading characteristics. 
IARAIN This variable is defined as IA3 less firm-specific structural characteristics. 
IAEXIT This variable is defined as the difference between IA1 and IARAIN. 
PIN1 The probability of information-based trades provided on a yearly frequency on Soeren Hvidkjaer’s website.  
PIN2 This variable is defined as PIN1 purged from market-wide commonality. 
PIN3 This variable is defined as PIN2 purged from stock-level trading characteristics. 
PINRAIN This variable is defined as PIN3 less firms-level structural characteristics. 
PINEXIT This variable is defined as the difference between PIN1 and PINRAIN. 
Market-level The value-weighted daily average of the stock-level variables (except for volatility). 
Volatility Market-level volatility is measured by the VIX index and by squared daily returns for individual stocks.  
Bid-ask spread The time-weighted daily average of the individual BBO percentage spread. 
Order-imbalance The absolute daily dollar-imbalance scaled by dollar trading volume orthogonalized to dollar trading volume. 
Unexpected changes in 
bid-ask spread 
The residual of a market-model fitted to stock-level quoted percentage bid-ask spreads. 
Unexpected changes in 
trading volume 
The residuals of a market-model fitted to stock-level dollar volume 
Tick size The inverse of the stock price. 
Firm size The stock-market capitalization. If used in return regressions, the natural logarithm of the last observation in the 
previous calendar year is used. 
Book value-to-market 
value 
The firm-level book-value divided by firm size. If used in return regressions, the natural logarithm of this measure is 
used. 
Operating profit margin The ratio of operating profit to sales.  
Research and develop-
ment-to-sales 
The ratio of research and development expenses to sales. 
Capital expenditures-to-
sales 
The ratio of capital expenditures to sales. 
Block-ownership - insider The total fraction of large stakes in common stock held by corporate insiders. 
Block-ownership - out-
sider 
 The total fraction of large stakes in common stock held by corporate outsiders. 
Options availability This variable is equal to one if the respective firm has exchange traded options on its common stock and zero other-
wise. 
Excess returns on the 
market 
The monthly returns on the market in excess of the risk-free rate. 
SMB The monthly returns on the Fama and French (1995)-factor portfolio SMB. 
HML  The monthly returns on the Fama and French (1995)-factor portfolio HML. 
Excess stock returns The individual monthly stock returns in excess of the risk-free rate. 
Beta The stock-level beta coefficient calculated as in Fama and French (1992). 
Effective spread The trade size-weighted daily average of the difference between the transaction price and the mid-point of the con-
current primary market BBO quotes. 
BETAup This variable is an up-market beta based on the definition of Pattengill and Sundaram (1995) and is equal to the 
estimated beta if excess market returns are positive and zero otherwise. 
BETAdown This variable is a down-market beta based on the definition of Pattengill and Sundaram (1995) and is equal to the 
estimated beta if excess market returns are negative and zero otherwise. 
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Table 3 – Correlation of Informed Trading with Explanatory Variables 
This table reports the correlation coefficients of the variables that that are used to capture the information environment (see Table 2 for variable definitions). 
 
Bid-ask Trading Vola- Order Bid-ask UED Trad. Vola- Order Tick Firm Profit Book/
15 min 30 min 60 min 1 day PIN1 Spread Volume tility Imbal. Spread Spread Vol. tility Imbal. Size Size Margin Market R&D Capex Ins. Outs.
IA1 over 30 minutes 0.92
IA1 over 60 minutes 0.83 0.90
IA1 over 1 day 0.33 0.36 0.40
PIN1 0.27 0.26 0.24 0.11
Market bid-ask spread 0.23 0.22 0.20 0.10 0.10
Market trading volume -0.08 -0.08 -0.07 -0.04 -0.15 -0.63
Market volatility 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.02 -0.06 -0.06 0.30
Market order-imbalance 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.14 -0.14 -0.19
Stock bid-ask spread 0.56 0.56 0.51 0.23 0.38 0.34 -0.16 0.04 0.03
Unexp. changes in B/A 0.24 0.24 0.21 0.08 -0.03 0.01 0.08 0.07 -0.03 0.53
Stock trading volume 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.02
Stock volatility 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00
Stock order-imbalance -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 -0.03 0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00
Stock tick size 0.42 0.41 0.37 0.16 0.26 0.00 0.04 0.07 -0.03 0.74 0.37 0.00 0.06 -0.01
Firm size -0.12 -0.11 -0.11 -0.05 -0.27 -0.07 0.07 0.01 -0.01 -0.16 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.13
Profit margin -0.12 -0.12 -0.11 -0.05 -0.15 -0.05 0.05 0.02 -0.01 -0.19 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.19 0.11
Book-to-market 0.14 0.15 0.13 0.06 0.21 -0.08 0.08 0.05 -0.04 0.24 0.11 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.27 -0.17 -0.08
Research and development -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.01 -0.12 -0.04 0.03 0.00 -0.01 -0.07 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.14 -0.05 -0.15
Capital expenditures 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.04 -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.02 0.40 0.06 -0.01
Ownership - insider 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 -0.06 -0.01 -0.05 -0.04
Ownership - outsider -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 -0.06 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 -0.10 -0.07 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.01




Firm-specific Structural CharacteristicsMarket-wide Commonality Stock-level Trading Characteristics
 
  56
Table 4 – Summary Statistics 
This table reports the summary statistics of the firm-level means of the variables listed in column Name calculated 
over the period between January 1995 and December 2005. The column Observations shows the total number of 
daily observations and the columns Mean, Q1, Median, Q3, and IQ Range report the mean, the first quartile, the me-
dian, the third quartile, and the difference between Q3 and Q1. The unit of measurement is given by the symbols bp, 
%, and $, which refer to basis points, percentages, and dollar values respectively (see Table 2 for variable defini-
tions).  
 
Measure Observations Mean Q1 Median Q3 IQ Range
IA1 over 15 minutes (bp) 3,829,045 24.01 10.74 17.93 29.99 19.25
IA1 over 30 minutes (bp) 3,828,167 24.12 10.79 18.22 30.09 19.30
IA1 over 60 minutes (bp) 3,827,750 24.18 10.79 18.16 30.14 19.35
IA1 over 1 day (bp) 3,543,002 28.05 12.15 20.72 35.11 22.95
PIN1 (%) 22,164 16.39 12.34 15.58 19.67 7.34
Market-level bid-ask spread (bp) 2,770 22.28 8.74 25.02 30.43 21.69
Market-level trading volume (millions of $) 2,770 186.16 97.80 200.54 250.17 152.37
Market-level volatility 2,770 20.70 15.40 20.11 24.44 9.04
Market-level order-imbalance (%) 2,770 26.81 22.64 25.70 29.47 6.83
Company-level bid-ask spread (bp) 3,829,045 84.50 31.02 53.80 99.99 68.97
Unexpected changes in bid-ask spread (bp) 3,829,045 0.17 -0.07 0.00 0.02 0.10
Stock-level trading volume (bp) 3,829,045 85.27 -2.38 0.00 47.88 50.26
Stock-level volatility (bp) 3,829,045 8.75 3.67 5.84 10.06 6.38
Stock-level order-imbalance (%) 3,829,045 53.40 19.93 24.86 33.30 13.36
Stock-level tick size (%) 3,829,045 7.10 3.06 4.62 7.83 4.77
Firm size (10 millions of $) 3,829,045 401.19 37.17 92.87 258.48 221.31
Operating profit margin (%) 3,829,045 17.00 7.19 13.72 24.07 16.88
Book value-to-market value (%) 3,829,045 54.35 26.03 47.83 74.99 48.96
Research and development-to-sales (%) 3,829,045 1.15 0.00 0.00 0.55 0.55
Capital expenditures-to-sales (%) 3,829,045 8.32 1.22 3.72 7.64 6.42
Block-ownership - insiders (%) 3,829,045 3.90 0.00 0.00 1.22 1.22
Block-ownership - outsiders (%) 3,829,045 9.69 0.00 0.52 17.11 17.11
Option availability (%) 3,829,045 62.48 0.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Excess return on the market (%) 132 0.70 -2.25 1.53 3.77 6.01
SMB (%) 132 0.22 -2.47 -0.14 2.63 5.10
HML (%) 132 0.43 -1.65 0.45 2.20 3.85
Excess stock returns (%) 174,611 1.07 0.47 1.09 1.84 1.37
Beta 3,629,560 0.97 0.76 0.91 1.15 0.39
Effective spread (%) 3,829,045 0.68 0.26 0.44 0.79 0.53











Table 5 – Decomposition of Yearly Informed Trading 
This table shows the results of regressing yearly informed trading, InfoTrade1, on a firm-specific intercept and a set of explanatory variables. The results of estimating the 
following regression at once is shown in Panel A: 
1, , ,0 1 2 3 4
1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 ,
1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 , ,
i t i
i t i t i t i t i t i t
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whereas Panels B and C show the same regression estimated in three steps according to: 
 
1, , ,0 1 2 3 4 ,
2, , ,0 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 , ,
3, , ,0 1 , 2 , 3 , 4
,
,
i t i i t
i t i i t i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t i i t i t i t i
InfoTrade MBA MVOL MVLA MOIB
InfoTrade VLA BA OIB TIC UEDSpread VOL
InfoTrade Insider Outsider Capex R & D
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where InfoTrade1 is alternatively represented by PIN1 or yearly averages of daily IA1. The hypotheses associated with the individual explanatory variables are shown in Table 1 
and the variable definitions are shown in Table 2. The regression coefficients associated with PIN1 are in percentages and the coefficients associated with IA1 are in basis points. 
P-values of a two-sided t-test of the coefficient being equal to zero are below (Panel A) or to the right (Panels B and C) of the respective coefficients in parentheses. The R2, 
based on the derivation by Nagelkerke (1991), is in percentages. The variables in Panels B and C are presented in decreasing order of their contribution to the R2. 
 
 Panel A – One-step Decomposition of the Information Environment  
VOL Vola VOL Vola Insider Outsider Capex R&D BTM Profit
PIN 1 1.01 -1.35 -0.10 0.33 0.80 2.10 50.42 0.63 0.33 -0.51 0.24 -0.73 -0.11 -0.89 -0.24 -0.03 -1.50 -1.37 46.5
(0.00) (0.00) (0.85) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.10) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.14) (0.00) (0.00) (0.68) (0.00) (0.00)
IA 1,15 min 9.62 2.13 1.81 2.49 2.52 25.70 22.00 1.30 0.71 1.16 -0.17 -0.63 0.67 -1.03 -0.24 -0.35 -1.42 -10.55 44.3
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.68) (0.56) (0.00) (0.55) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.12) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00)
IA 1,30 min 8.74 1.91 1.89 2.56 2.54 25.17 24.57 0.83 1.43 1.12 -0.24 -0.62 0.65 -1.14 0.18 -0.30 -1.31 -10.62 44.1
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.90) (0.24) (0.00) (0.42) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.23) (0.10) (0.00) (0.00)
IA 1,60 min 9.32 1.83 1.90 2.60 2.46 21.97 23.68 0.92 1.32 1.07 -0.13 -0.54 0.61 -1.31 0.15 -0.44 -1.22 -10.34 48.6
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.12) (0.25) (0.00) (0.63) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.31) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
IA 1,1 day 10.60 1.27 1.81 3.64 5.86 0.99 36.30 1.08 0.32 1.11 0.44 0.10 0.57 -1.88 -0.22 -1.55 -1.25 -10.94 31.9














Ownership Struc. Asset Tangibility Window-dressing Options as 
Alternative
Variables Capturing Features of the Information Environment of Investors




Table 5 – Decomposition of Yearly Informed Trading (continued) 
Panel B – Three-step Decomposition of the Information Environment Captured by PIN1 
 
Variable Coeff p-value R2
Volume -1.31 (0.00) 39.7
Order-imbalance 0.54 (0.00)
Volatility 0.14 (0.00)
Bid-ask spread 0.37 (0.00)
Order-imbalance 0.34 (0.00) 43.5
UED Spread -0.28 (0.00)
Volume 1.87 (0.00)
Bid-ask spread 0.13 (0.00)
Volatility 54.00 (0.08)
Tick size 0.04 (0.35)
Firm size -1.15 (0.00) 34.8
Ownership - corporate outsiders -0.77 (0.00)
Research and development -0.92 (0.00)
Option availability -2.47 (0.00)
Book-to-market -0.29 (0.00)
Ownership - corporate insiders 0.27 (0.01)
Capital expenditures -0.14 (0.07)







Panel C – Three-step Decomposition of the Information Environment Captured by IA1 
 
Coeff p-value R2




Volatility 29.47 (0.00) 30.7
UED Spread 2.98 (0.00)
Bid-ask spread 1.83 (0.00)
Volume 26.50 (0.00)
Tick size 2.61 (0.00)
Order-imbalance 1.24 (0.00)
Firm size -9.27 (0.00) 21.2
Profit margin -0.64 (0.00)
Option availability -1.15 (0.00)
Capital expenditures 0.50 (0.02)
Research and development -1.29 (0.01)
Ownership - corporate outsiders -0.21 (0.34)
Book-to-market -0.14 (0.35)








Table 6 – Time-series and Cross-sectional Associations in Daily Informed Trading 
This table shows the results of regressing daily values of informed trading measured by IA1 on a firm-specific intercept and a set of 
explanatory variables by firm size decile according to: 
1, , ,0 1 2 3 4 ,
2, , ,0 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 , ,
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,
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where IA1 is estimated over 60 minutes. The hypotheses associated with the individual explanatory variables are shown in Table 1 and 
the variable definitions are shown in Table 2. Panel A presents the results of regressing IA1 on variables that capture market-wide 
commonality. Panel B presents the results of regressing IA2 on stock-level trading characteristics, and Panel C shows the results of 
regressing IA3 on firm-specific structural characteristics. In the table below, the column Decile shows the size group with Decile 10 
referring to the largest size group. Regression coefficients shown in column Coeff are in basis points, p-values are to the right of the 
respective coefficients in parentheses and the R2 is in percentages (based on the derivation by Nagelkerke (1991)). The variables are 
presented in decreasing order of their contribution to the average explanatory power going from the left to the right. 
 
Panel A – Market-wide Commonality in Daily Informed Trading 
 
p-value p-value p-value p-value
1 14.08 (0.00) 5.99 (0.00) 4.13 (0.00) 0.16 (0.32) 37.2
2 11.26 (0.00) 2.81 (0.00) 2.75 (0.00) 0.43 (0.00) 40.7
3 10.38 (0.00) 2.64 (0.00) 1.65 (0.00) 0.36 (0.00) 41.3
4 8.76 (0.00) 1.73 (0.00) 1.27 (0.00) 0.69 (0.00) 40.6
5 7.80 (0.00) 1.46 (0.00) 1.13 (0.00) 0.92 (0.00) 40.1
6 7.02 (0.00) 1.40 (0.00) 0.91 (0.00) 1.18 (0.00) 39.7
7 6.05 (0.00) 0.97 (0.00) 0.61 (0.00) 1.12 (0.00) 39.2
8 5.26 (0.00) 0.80 (0.00) 0.59 (0.00) 1.21 (0.00) 38.5
9 4.26 (0.00) 0.55 (0.00) 0.32 (0.00) 1.25 (0.00) 37.8
10 3.24 (0.00) 0.50 (0.00) 0.39 (0.00) 1.34 (0.00) 38.1
VolumeBid-ask spread Volatility Order-imbalance




Panel B – Informed Trading and Stock-level Trading Characteristics 
 
p-value p-value p-value p-value p-value p-value
1 5.09 (0.00) 3.08 (0.00) 12.60 (0.00) 7.16 (0.00) 3.09 (0.00) 4.06 (0.00) 39.1
2 5.81 (0.00) 3.12 (0.00) 4.98 (0.00) 3.41 (0.00) -1.30 (0.00) 3.00 (0.00) 39.6
3 5.64 (0.00) 2.90 (0.00) 3.56 (0.00) 2.44 (0.00) -1.06 (0.00) 2.73 (0.00) 39.4
4 7.47 (0.00) 2.82 (0.00) 2.50 (0.00) 1.89 (0.00) -1.04 (0.00) 2.38 (0.00) 39.2
5 4.30 (0.00) 2.34 (0.00) 2.02 (0.00) 1.68 (0.00) -0.62 (0.00) 2.08 (0.00) 37.8
6 6.60 (0.00) 2.16 (0.00) 1.54 (0.00) 1.44 (0.00) -0.65 (0.00) 1.87 (0.00) 37.3
7 5.49 (0.00) 1.56 (0.00) 1.17 (0.00) 1.15 (0.00) -0.28 (0.00) 1.71 (0.00) 36.3
8 8.84 (0.00) 1.43 (0.00) 0.69 (0.00) 1.03 (0.00) -0.28 (0.00) 1.68 (0.00) 36.2
9 8.08 (0.00) 1.12 (0.00) 0.44 (0.00) 0.88 (0.00) -0.23 (0.00) 1.64 (0.00) 35.2
10 12.32 (0.00) 0.91 (0.00) 0.11 (0.00) 0.81 (0.00) -0.04 (0.04) 1.68 (0.00) 37.4
Volatility Bid-ask spread Order-imbalanceTick sizeUED Spread Volume




Table 6 – Time-series and Cross-sectional Associations in Daily Informed Trading 
(continued) 
Panel C – Informed Trading and Firm-specific Structural Characteristics 
 
p-val p-val p-val p-val p-val p-val p-val p-val
1 -21.67 (0.00) -2.24 (0.00) -1.11 (0.00) 9.00 (0.00) 6.57 (0.00) -2.24 (0.01) 1.26 (0.00) 5.46 (0.00) 32.9
2 -18.95 (0.00) -2.53 (0.00) -0.31 (0.05) 1.19 (0.00) -1.79 (0.00) -2.74 (0.00) -0.01 (0.98) 4.50 (0.00) 37.9
3 -9.83 (0.00) -2.26 (0.00) -0.03 (0.82) 0.58 (0.01) 0.12 (0.67) -1.65 (0.00) -1.29 (0.00) 1.79 (0.00) 37.9
4 -9.23 (0.00) -1.31 (0.00) 0.55 (0.00) 0.51 (0.00) 1.73 (0.00) 0.13 (0.73) -0.79 (0.00) 1.11 (0.00) 35.9
5 -4.35 (0.00) -1.39 (0.00) 0.13 (0.27) 0.52 (0.00) 1.38 (0.00) 0.60 (0.17) -0.02 (0.91) -0.31 (0.00) 35.7
6 -6.20 (0.00) -0.87 (0.00) 0.04 (0.68) 1.03 (0.00) 0.30 (0.07) 0.43 (0.23) -1.11 (0.00) -1.66 (0.00) 34.6
7 -3.87 (0.00) -0.89 (0.00) 0.51 (0.00) 0.86 (0.00) 0.35 (0.01) -0.11 (0.65) -0.21 (0.05) -0.87 (0.00) 33.9
8 -2.82 (0.00) -0.40 (0.00) 0.91 (0.00) 0.25 (0.00) -0.19 (0.10) -1.55 (0.00) 0.20 (0.05) -1.09 (0.00) 32.3
9 -2.26 (0.00) -0.35 (0.00) 0.27 (0.00) -0.17 (0.00) -0.66 (0.00) -0.61 (0.00) -0.13 (0.13) -0.62 (0.00) 31.3
10 -1.31 (0.00) 0.16 (0.00) 0.38 (0.00) 0.14 (0.00) 0.35 (0.00) 0.66 (0.00) -0.23 (0.00) -0.31 (0.00) 30.7
BTM OptionsProfitFirm Size Insider CapexOutsider R&D
Decile Coeff Coeff CoeffCoeff Coeff R2CoeffCoeff Coeff
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Table 7 – Analysis of Common Variation and Idiosyncratic Informed Trading 
The table below shows a decomposition of explained variation in informed trading, ?( )1Var IA , into three components by 
estimating the following regression for every stock individually: 
1, 0 , , ,1 1 1
.t i i t j j t k k t ti j kIA Commonality Trading Structuralα β γ δ ε= = == + + + +∑ ∑ ∑  
 




















= δ= ∑  
where REP denotes the relative explanatory power related to i market-wide Commonality components, to j stock-level Trading 
characteristics and to k Structural characteristics. Numbers below are averages of the firm-level REPCommonality, REPTrading, and 
REPStructural calculated by regressing IA1 estimated over 60 minutes for each stock individually on all explanatory variables and 
summing up the ratios of explained to total variance by commonality, trading, and structural components. Unexplained Informed 
Trading is the average of one minus the R-square from the stock-level ordinary least-square regressions. Results are shown by 
firm size decile, where Size Decile is calculated based on the average market capitalization a firm has over the entire sample 





1 27.7 64.4 7.9 78.1
2 32.8 59.6 7.6 75.7
3 40.8 52.3 6.9 73.7
4 43.7 49.3 7.0 73.8
5 47.1 45.3 7.6 73.1
6 47.6 44.8 7.6 71.8
7 53.4 39.7 6.9 72.1
8 57.7 36.1 6.2 70.9
9 62.4 31.0 6.6 69.3
10 60.9 33.6 5.4 68.0
Average Relative Explanatory Power of (in %)
Market-wide Firm-specificStock-level




Table 8 – Cross-sectional Returns and Components of Informed Trading 
This table shows the results of a Fama and MacBeth (1973)-type cross-sectional regression of monthly portfolio returns in excess of the one-month Treasury bill rate on a 
set of explanatory variables and the average level of informed trading during the previous month that is estimated within each month. The regression is estimated monthly 
between January 1995 and December 2005: 
0 1 , 2 , 3 4 5 , ,
e
p up p down p p up k p tR BETA BETA Size BTM InfoTradeκ κ κ κ κ κ ζ= + + + + + +  
where BETAup and BETAdown are up-market and down-market betas, respectively, the subscript p denotes portfolio p, and InfoTradek refers to the measure k of informed 
trading or the average level of daily effective spread during the previous month (see Table 2 for variable definitions). Panel A shows the results when the regressions are 
estimated using the monthly excess returns of 50 portfolios formed on the average level of InfoTradek during the previous year, whereby InfoTradek is captured by PIN1, 
PIN2, PIN3, PINRAIN, or PINEXIT. Panel B shows the results when the regressions are estimated using the monthly excess returns of 50 portfolios formed on the average 
level of InfoTradek during the previous month, whereby InfoTradek is captured by the effective spread, IA1, IA2, IA3, IARAIN, or IAEXIT. IARAIN2 or PINRAIN2 is calculated by 
regressing all explanatory variables on IA1. Portfolios are based on IARAIN or PINRAIN if InfoTradek is not included in the regression. IA1 is estimated over 60 minutes. T-
values are based on the Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979)-adjustment. The coefficients, shown in columns Coeff, are in percentages with p-values based on a two-
sided t-test of the coefficient being equal to zero in parentheses to the right of the respective coefficients. The column R2 shows the average adjusted R-square from the 
individual cross-sectional regressions. 
 
Panel A – Cross-sectional Return-Association of PIN1 
Coeff p-val Coeff p-val Coeff p-val Coeff p-val Coeff p-val Coeff p-val Coeff p-val Coeff p-val Coeff p-val Coeff p-val Coeff p-val R2
-0.69 (0.00) -0.37 (0.00) -6.73 (0.00) 3.42 (0.00) 3.27 (0.01) 23.2
2.38 (0.06) -0.78 (0.00) -0.23 (0.08) -6.99 (0.00) 2.59 (0.00) 2.59 (0.10) 29.9
2.23 (0.04) -0.76 (0.00) -0.25 (0.06) -7.00 (0.00) 2.50 (0.00) 2.81 (0.07) 29.9
1.92 (0.04) -0.56 (0.00) -0.16 (0.24) -6.78 (0.00) 3.33 (0.00) 1.61 (0.33) 29.5
2.52 (0.03) -0.72 (0.00) -0.26 (0.05) -5.96 (0.00) 3.21 (0.00) 2.00 (0.18) 26.5
-6.11 (0.34) -0.55 (0.00) -0.82 (0.00) -5.81 (0.00) 3.05 (0.00) 6.76 (0.00) 27.5









Table 8 – Cross-sectional Returns and Components of Informed Trading (continued) 
 
Panel B – Cross-sectional Return-Association of IA1 
Coeff p-val Coeff p-val Coeff p-val Coeff p-val Coeff p-val Coeff p-val Coeff p-val Coeff p-val Coeff p-val Coeff p-val Coeff p-val Coeff p-val R2
-96.72 (0.00) -0.04 (0.98) 0.20 (0.04) -1.26 (0.00) 1.98 (0.00) -2.02 (0.21) 27.4
-0.50 (0.16) 0.17 (0.01) -1.19 (0.00) 1.78 (0.00) -2.37 (0.20) 22.6
326.68 (0.00) 0.00 (0.77) -0.07 (0.08) -1.32 (0.00) 1.38 (0.00) 2.62 (0.28) 29.7
329.68 (0.00) -0.19 (0.70) -0.08 (0.05) -1.43 (0.00) 1.42 (0.00) 2.71 (0.12) 32.6
221.50 (0.00) 0.08 (0.47) -0.24 (0.08) -1.75 (0.00) 1.28 (0.00) 5.36 (0.02) 33.8
369.09 (0.00) -0.10 (0.99) -0.26 (0.01) -1.18 (0.00) 1.35 (0.00) -3.37 (0.03) 34.7
-608.68 (0.00) -0.09 (0.59) 0.00 (0.88) -1.46 (0.00) 2.29 (0.00) 0.48 (0.71) 36.6





Firm Size Down-market Up-market InterceptIARAIN
Effective 
Spread IA1 IA2 IA3 IAEXIT
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Table 9 – Pooled Time-series Cross-sectional Association of Informed Trading and Returns 
This table shows the results of fitting a pooled time-series cross-sectional generalized least square regression of monthly portfolio excess returns on monthly factor 
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Subscript s denotes the firm size group, subscript p indicates the book-to-market group, subscript j the rank of the level of informed trading, and t is the time-
index. Five monthly firm size groups and book-to-market groups are formed based on firm size and the book-to-market ratio at the end of the previous year. Simi-
larly, the average level of informed trading of every stock during the previous month is used to calculate informed trading quintiles. The lowest level of informed 
trading is assigned informed trading quintile rank 1 and the highest level of informed trading is assigned quintile rank 5. Portfolio excess returns, Re, are calcu-
lated as the equally-weighted cross-sectional mean of monthly stock returns in excess of the one-month Treasury bill rate of all stocks that are in the same firm 
size group and have the same informed trading quintile rank (to calculate , ,
e
s j tR ) or that are in the same firm size group, are in the same book-to-market group, and 
have the same informed trading quintile rank (to calculate , , ,
e
s p j tR ). , ,
m
s j tR , SMBs,j,t, and HMLs,j,t are equal to the market excess returns, and the returns on the SMB 
and HML factor portfolios, if the respective portfolio belongs to firm size group s and to informed trading quintile rank j and zero otherwise. , , ,
m
s p j tR , SMBs,p,j,t, 
and HMLs,p,j,t are equal to the market excess returns, and the returns on the SMB and HML factor portfolios if the respective portfolio belongs to firm size group s, 
to book-to-market group p, and to informed trading quintile rank j and zero otherwise. Informed trading is captured by IA1 estimated over 60 minutes. The estima-
tion uses a generalized least square regression with a random intercept model to account for potential correlation within portfolios. The column Portfolio Sort 
shows whether the portfolios are sorted on size and informed trading (Size and IA) alone or whether the portfolios are formed based on size, book-to-market, and 
informed trading (Size, BTM, and IA). The portfolio-specific coefficients of Rm, SMB, and HML are suppressed for clarity of exposition. Coefficients (Coeff) are 
in percentages and the associated p-value is in parentheses to the right.  
 
  IA1  IA2  IA3   IARAIN  IAEXIT 
Portfolio Sort Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value   Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value 
Size and IA 6.5 (1.00) –0.4 (0.49) 0.8 (0.22)  3.0 (1.00) –0.4 (1.00) 
            




Table 10 – Robustness Checks 
This table reports in Panel A the results of re-estimating regressions (2) to (6) in a different order, whereby the stock-level trading environment is regressed on IA1 and used to 
construct IA2, which is regressed on the variables capturing the market-wide trading environment. IA3 is then constructed using the resulting regression coefficients and is then 
regressed on firm-level structural characteristics. The results reported below refer to IA1a horizon of 60 minutes. Panel B reports the results of regressing daily averages of 
intra-day quote-returns on variables that capture market-wide commonality, stock-level trading characteristics, and firm-specific structural characteristics by firm size deciles 
using a stock-specific intercept according to: 
. , ,0 1 2 3 4 5 i,t 6 i,t 7 i,t 8 i,t 9 i,t 10 i,t
11 , 12 , 13 , 14 , 15 , 16 , 17 ,
MVLA Spread
Insider Outsider Capex R&D Profit Options
i t i t t t t
i t i t i t i t i t i t i t
QuoteReturn MBA MVOL MOIB VLA BA OIB TIC UED VOL
BTM
π π π π π π π π π π π
π π π π π π π π
= + + + + + + + + + + +
+ + + + + + + 18 , , ,i t i tSize ν+  
where QuoteReturni,t denotes the daily average of intra-day returns of the BBO quote mid-point and the BBO quote mid-point 15 minutes later of stock i on day t. The 
hypotheses associated with the various variables are shown in Table 1 the variable definitions are shown in Table 2. In the table below, the column Decile shows the size 
group with Decile 10 referring to the largest size group. Regression coefficients shown in column Coeff are in basis points, p-values are to the right of the respective 
coefficients in parentheses and the R2 is in percentages (based on the derivation by Nagelkerke (1991)). Panel C shows the results of a principal component analysis on the 
RAIN time-series. Thereby, only stocks that have observations for at least 97.5% of the sample period are used. The column RAIN Based on shows the horizon over which IA1 
is estimated that is used to construct RAIN, column Number of Days shows the number of days of the sample period included in the estimation, whereas Number of Firms 
shows how many individual firms are included. Sample Variance Explained (%) shows the percentage of the total RAIN-variance explained by the first, second, and third 





Table 10 – Robustness Checks (Continued) 
 
Panel A – Association of Information Asymmetry with Explanatory Variables in Different Order 
 
Regression Variable Statistic 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Coeff 9.13 0.35 -1.04 -0.39 -0.52 -0.26 -0.28 -0.33 -0.45 -0.47
p-val (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Coeff 0.07 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03
p-val (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Coeff 1.18 1.20 1.55 5.56 8.57 9.31 12.71 13.99 17.06 20.81
p-val (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Coeff 0.07 -0.16 -0.05 -0.13 0.04 -0.01 0.01 -0.04 0.00 0.06
p-val (0.61) (0.02) (0.33) (0.01) (0.31) (0.77) (0.84) (0.16) (0.99) (0.00)
Coeff 1.21 -1.36 -0.23 -0.25 -0.17 -0.07 -0.10 -0.20 -0.32 -0.21
p-val (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.13) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Coeff -5.01 -0.71 0.29 0.13 0.23 0.13 0.22 0.22 0.13 0.27
p-val (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
R2 36.43 38.84 38.84 38.10 37.45 36.74 35.94 34.59 33.46 32.71
Coeff 3.09 0.08 0.34 0.17 0.13 0.12 0.03 0.09 0.18 0.40
p-val (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00)
Coeff 2.11 1.05 1.03 0.18 0.03 0.07 0.10 0.24 0.55 0.70
p-val (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Coeff 0.05 -0.67 -0.40 -0.30 -0.08 -0.11 0.32 0.18 0.17 0.18
p-val (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Coeff 0.07 0.77 0.38 0.21 0.17 0.09 0.05 0.03 0.15 0.42
p-val (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
R2 35.15 39.25 38.92 38.09 37.48 36.70 35.84 34.72 33.59 32.75
Coeff -4.52 -3.71 -3.11 -2.74 -2.54 -2.24 -1.59 -0.94 -0.87 -0.06
p-val (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Coeff -0.83 -0.48 -0.45 -0.21 -0.34 -0.43 -0.02 0.09 0.02 -0.21
p-val (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00)
Coeff 1.10 -0.20 0.20 0.15 0.17 -0.26 0.13 0.20 -0.15 -0.27
p-val (0.00) (0.04) (0.02) (0.05) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Coeff 1.23 0.12 0.34 0.58 0.16 0.32 -0.10 0.23 -0.18 0.10
p-val (0.00) (0.32) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Coeff -4.10 1.00 0.13 -0.75 0.20 0.05 0.32 -0.07 -0.14 0.10
p-val (0.00) (0.00) (0.23) (0.00) (0.01) (0.41) (0.00) (0.18) (0.00) (0.00)
Coeff -1.79 0.07 0.53 -0.30 0.54 0.29 0.55 -0.21 -0.09 -0.23
p-val (0.00) (0.66) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00)
Coeff 1.78 0.53 -0.56 0.26 -0.58 -0.04 -0.24 -0.06 0.14 0.28
p-val (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.49) (0.00) (0.20) (0.00) (0.00)
Coeff -5.47 -0.06 0.86 1.24 0.15 -0.47 -0.69 -1.57 -0.52 -0.35
p-val (0.00) (0.80) (0.00) (0.00) (0.32) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)































Table 10 – Robustness Checks (Continued) 
 
Panel B – Association of Quote-returns with Explanatory Variables 
Coeff p-val Coeff p-val Coeff p-val Coeff p-val Coeff p-val Coeff p-val Coeff p-val Coeff p-val Coeff p-val Coeff p-val
Bid-ask spread -1.8 (0.00) -1.4 (0.00) -1.2 (0.00) -0.7 (0.00) -0.9 (0.00) -0.8 (0.00) -0.6 (0.00) -0.5 (0.00) -0.5 (0.00) -0.3 (0.00)
Volume -0.5 (0.00) -0.1 (0.00) -0.1 (0.00) -0.1 (0.00) 0.0 (0.44) 0.0 (0.19) 0.0 (0.41) 0.0 (0.09) 0.1 (0.00) 0.1 (0.00)
Volatility -0.8 (0.00) -0.4 (0.00) -0.2 (0.00) 0.0 (0.09) 0.0 (0.89) 0.1 (0.00) 0.1 (0.00) 0.2 (0.00) 0.2 (0.00) 0.2 (0.00)
Order-imbalance 1.0 (0.00) 1.1 (0.00) 1.1 (0.00) 1.2 (0.00) 1.1 (0.00) 1.1 (0.00) 1.1 (0.00) 1.1 (0.00) 1.1 (0.00) 1.2 (0.00)
Volatility 1.4 (0.00) 0.2 (0.00) 0.2 (0.00) 1.5 (0.00) 1.0 (0.00) 1.6 (0.00) 1.1 (0.00) 1.3 (0.00) 1.6 (0.00) 2.0 (0.00)
UED spread -1.1 (0.00) -0.6 (0.00) -0.3 (0.00) 0.0 (0.31) -0.1 (0.00) -0.1 (0.00) 0.0 (0.13) 0.1 (0.00) 0.1 (0.00) 0.2 (0.00)
Bid-ask spread 2.1 (0.00) 1.4 (0.00) 1.1 (0.00) 0.7 (0.00) 0.8 (0.00) 0.7 (0.00) 0.4 (0.00) 0.3 (0.00) 0.2 (0.00) -0.1 (0.01)
Volume 0.3 (0.00) 0.4 (0.00) 0.4 (0.00) 0.4 (0.00) 0.4 (0.00) 0.4 (0.00) 0.3 (0.00) 0.3 (0.00) 0.2 (0.00) 0.1 (0.00)
Tick size -1.7 (0.00) -0.8 (0.00) -0.5 (0.00) -0.6 (0.00) -0.5 (0.00) -0.4 (0.00) -0.3 (0.00) -0.3 (0.00) -0.3 (0.00) -0.1 (0.00)
Order-imbalance 0.5 (0.00) 0.8 (0.00) 0.9 (0.00) 1.0 (0.00) 1.2 (0.00) 1.3 (0.00) 1.4 (0.00) 1.6 (0.00) 1.7 (0.00) 2.2 (0.00)
Firm size 3.0 (0.00) 3.5 (0.00) 3.4 (0.00) 3.0 (0.00) 2.0 (0.00) 1.8 (0.00) 1.6 (0.00) 1.2 (0.00) 0.6 (0.00) 0.0 (0.96)
Profit -0.4 (0.02) -0.3 (0.00) -0.2 (0.00) -0.4 (0.00) -0.3 (0.00) -0.2 (0.00) -0.4 (0.00) -0.4 (0.00) -0.2 (0.00) -0.1 (0.02)
BTM 1.2 (0.00) 0.9 (0.00) 1.1 (0.00) 0.8 (0.00) 0.4 (0.00) 0.4 (0.00) 0.4 (0.00) 0.2 (0.00) 0.1 (0.03) -0.1 (0.02)
Outsider -0.1 (0.84) 0.7 (0.00) 0.5 (0.00) 0.2 (0.01) -0.1 (0.18) 0.0 (0.49) 0.1 (0.00) 0.1 (0.01) 0.1 (0.12) -0.1 (0.01)
Insider -0.7 (0.19) 0.0 (0.93) 0.2 (0.04) 0.2 (0.10) 0.0 (0.81) 0.2 (0.01) 0.2 (0.00) -0.1 (0.26) -0.2 (0.00) 0.0 (0.58)
R&D 0.1 (0.88) 0.2 (0.57) -0.7 (0.00) -0.7 (0.00) 0.1 (0.66) 0.1 (0.56) -0.1 (0.38) -0.5 (0.00) -0.4 (0.00) 0.0 (0.63)
Capex -0.6 (0.00) -0.2 (0.01) 0.0 (0.64) -0.1 (0.04) -0.1 (0.36) -0.1 (0.02) -0.3 (0.00) 0.0 (0.72) 0.0 (0.59) 0.0 (0.93)
Options 0.0 (0.00) 0.0 (0.00) 0.0 (0.00) 0.0 (0.00) 0.0 (0.00) 0.0 (0.00) 0.0 (0.00) 0.0 (0.00) 0.0 (0.00) 0.0 (0.00)















Panel C – Principal Component Analysis on RAIN 
 
      Sample Variance Explained (%) 
RAIN Based on Number of Days Number of Stocks 1st PC 2nd PC 3rd PC 
IA1 over 15 minutes 1,235.00 656.00 7.05 3.77 1.08 
   7.05 10.82 11.90 
IA1 over 30 minutes 1,244.00 655.00 5.17 2.78 0.96 
   5.17 7.95 8.92 
IA1 over 60 minutes 1,224.00 656.00 4.20 2.00 0.93 
   4.20 6.20 7.13 
IA1 over 1 day 1,253.00 574.00 3.41 1.02 0.89 
      3.41 4.43 5.32 
 
